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Careflow: Theory and Practice 
John Fox1,3 and Robert Dunlop2 
1Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 
2InferMed Ltd, London, UK 
3UCL Medical School and Royal Free Hospital, London, UK 
 
 
Abstract. In this presentation we shall review different ways of describing the 
processes of delivering patient care, and relate these to traditional workflow in 
business processes, and the concept of “careflow” proposed by Panzarasa and 
her colleagues in Pavia. We shall discuss the problem of designing a careflow 
application as a form of process modelling, to be contrasted with older 
paradigms ranging from rule-based alerts and reminders to Petri nets and 
Critical path analysis. We shall also consider the need for specialised 
formalisms for describing clinical processes, drawing on experience with 
workflow languages (e.g. BPEL4WS, BPMN), guideline modelling languages 
(e.g. GLIF, PROforma), AI planning languages (e.g. PDDL, OCL) and “agent” 
programming systems (e.g. LALO, 3APL). The adoption of clinical workflow 
technology will greatly benefit from the availability of appropriate languages 
for declaratively representing processes of care. To explore some of the 
requirements for a clinical workflow technology we will review and critique the 
PROforma process modelling language and the Arezzo® and Tallis toolsets 
which use it. The discussion will be illustrated with deployed applications and 
operational prototypes. 
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Guideline Models, Process Specification, and Workflow 
Samson W. Tu, MS 
Stanford University School of Medicine 
Stanford, CA 94305-5479, USA  
 
Abstract. Many clinical practice guidelines use flowcharts to aid the 
description of recommendations specified in the guidelines. Similarly a number 
of computer-interpretable guideline formalisms use graphical task networks to 
organize knowledge formalized in these models. However, the precise meaning 
encoded in these graphical structures is often unclear. In this presentation, I will 
survey some of the computer-interpretable formalisms and analyzed the 
graphical representations that are used to express process information embodied 
in clinical guidelines and protocols. I will argue that we can distinguish a 
number of process types: (1) flowcharts for capturing problem-solving 
processes, (2) disease-state maps that link decision points in managing patient 
problems over time, (3) plans that specify sequences of activities that contribute 
toward a goal, (4) workflow specifications that model care processes in an 
organization, and (5) computational processes that generates recommendations 
for specific clinical situations. These process types may be related to each other. 
A plan of actions, for example, may be mapped to a workflow process when its 
actions are assigned to healthcare providers playing different roles. A flowchart 
may depict decisions and actions that are performed over time. Furthermore, a 
guideline formalism may not make a commitment to the nature of processes 
being modeled. Its process-specification language may be used to encode 
different types of processes. Nevertheless, understanding the nature of process 
being modeled is crucial when it comes to enacting the encoded guidelines and 
protocols to provide decision support in clinical workflow. A process 
description that models the problem-solving steps depicted in a narrative 
guideline, for example, may contain steps that are not appropriate as part of 
human-computer interactions in a busy clinic. 
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Restrictions in Process Design:  
A Case Study on Workflows in Healthcare 
Jörg Becker, Christian Janiesch 
 
European Research Center for Information Systems, 
Leonardo Campus 3, 48149 Münster, Germany 
{becker, janiesch}@ercis.de 
Abstract. Automating existing processes is as paving cow path compared to 
major business process reengineering. However, this rather radical approach is 
not suitable for all business fields. It requires the freedom to modify 
organizational structures and free core business processes from non-value 
adding activities. In sectors like healthcare, there are a variety of legal 
restrictions and treatment guidelines practitioners have to comply with. Hence, 
freedom to reorganize the organization and to omit non-value adding activities 
is heavily compromised. In this paper we present findings from a case study 
that exemplify restrictions in process reorganization and suggest utilizing more 
moderate approaches to process management. 
Keywords: Process design, design restrictions, process management, workflow 
management, healthcare, infection control. 
1   Introduction 
Hammer and Champy [8] see the practice of automating existing processes as “paving 
cow path” compared to major Business Process Reengineering (BPR). While it is 
desirable to take the blinkers off to free oneself from restraints of everyday 
procedures this rather radical approach is not suitable for all business fields. BPR 
requires the freedom to modify organizational structures and free core business 
processes from non-value adding activities. This requires introducing radical changes 
as well as new procedures. In business sectors like healthcare, there are a variety of 
legal restrictions and treatment guidelines practitioners have to comply with [21, 22]. 
Hence, freedom to reorganize the organization and to omit non-value adding activities 
as well as to change mandatory procedures and existing medical information systems 
(IS) is heavily compromised. 
Thus, in healthcare one needs to utilize the less radical principles of Business 
Process Management (BPM) [1, 25]. Short and precise projects and continuous 
improvement offer a passable way despite a restrictive environment and legal pre-
requisites. Through small iterations potential for process optimization, i.e. reduce 
cost, free staff from routine work, and improve patient safety without reengineering 
the company can be achieved. This paper presents a case, performed to show how 
BPM and commercial off-the-shelf workflow software contribute to lower the 
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frequency of human errors in healthcare [10, 11] by introducing gradual change. The 
goal of the case study was to improve efficiency of an existing controlling process for 
hospital acquired infections (HAI). 
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, a short literature review summarizes 
relevant facts on BPR and BPM as well as workflow management. In Section 3 an 
introduction to healthcare and clinical processes is given as characterization of the 
project. Section 4 comprises the case study including details on restrictions in process 
design as well as on the subsequent workflow implementation. The paper closes with 
conclusions to an outlook. 
2   Fundamentals of Processes and Workflows 
Processes are generally seen as any activity performed within a company or an 
organization [14]. In the context of this work, we define a process as “a completely 
closed, timely and logical sequence of activities which are required to work on a 
process-oriented business object” [1]. Consequently, a business process is considered 
as a special kind of process that is directed by business objectives of a company and 
by the business environment [1]. Business processes can be further classified into 
value creating core business processes and not value adding supplementary processes. 
Whereas core business processes are considered to contain corporate expertise and 
produce products or services that are delivered to customers [9, 16], supplementary 
business processes facilitate the ongoing operation of the core processes. This 
distinction is not intended to be always selective as one business process might be a 
core business process for one product and a supplementary business process for 
another [1]. 
The practice of business process reengineering, which emerged in the early 1990s, 
is seen as fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes. In doing 
so dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as 
cost, quality, service, and speed can be achieved [8]. This kind of greenfield project, 
however, does not consider any existing operational sequences or organizational 
structures during the building of new processes at all. Furthermore, BPR targets the 
overall process perspective in one single shot rather than iteratively and continuously 
optimizing process performance. BPM on the other hand serves the planning, 
controlling, and monitoring of intra- and inter-organizational processes with regards 
to existent operational sequences and structures, in a consistent, continuous iterative 
way of process improvement [1]. 
In dependence to processes, workflows can be seen as part of a work process that 
contains the sequence of functions and information about the data and resources 
involved in the execution of these functions [2]. Workflows are an automated 
representation of a whole or part of a business process. Procedural rules define 
documents, information or tasks, which are to be passed from one participant to 
another for action [27]. 
To-be process models are used as sources to implement workflows. Therefore, 
process models need to be transformed into workflow models. Process models, 
however, primarily serve organizational (re-)design whereas workflow models focus 
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on implementing IT support. That is why process models integrate functions in a 
lower level of granularity than workflow models [2]. 
While creating workflow models, workflow relevant data is required for the 
refinement of functions. In consequence, the necessity for a detailed specification of 
data needed during the execution of activities and data needed to create mathematic 
routing conditions emerges. Also, criteria when to initiate and when to terminate a 
workflow and how to handle errors are to be defined [28]. 
Workflow Management (WfM) aims at providing this automated process execution 
where the transitions between the individual activities are controlled by a Workflow 
Management System (WfMS) [28]. If an activity cannot be automated, a WfMS is 
concerned with demanding input from users while providing all necessary 
information needed to make a decision. 
3   Healthcare and Clinical Processes 
Healthcare providers are under constant pressure to reduce costs while the quality of 
care is to be improved [10]. Expenses for patient treatment and pharmaceuticals are 
relentlessly rising whereas reimbursements, refunded by insurance providers, are 
coupled to diagnosis-related groups and fixed [7]. 
Clinical processes can be classified as generic process patterns or medical 
treatment processes [12, 15]. Both types of processes may be designed and executed 
cross-department as well as cross-company. Generic process patterns help to 
coordinate healthcare processes among different people and organizational units. 
Medical treatment processes are the representation of an actual care process, which 
are considered to be the core processes of healthcare facilities. These processes highly 
depend on medical knowledge and case specific decisions [15]. Clinical process 
decisions are made by interpreting patient specific data according to clinical 
knowledge. In order to provide clinical decision support, patient specific data needs to 
be consolidated and a recallable representation of clinical knowledge needs to be 
provided in medical IS. The cooperation of clinical knowledge and complex decision 
support allows the implementation of treatment guidelines in highly flexible 
processes. Flexibility is required since treatment of patients is likely to differ from 
patient to patient. In consequence, medical treatment processes need to be quickly 
adaptable [12]. Medical treatment processes can be further described as a diagnostic-
therapeutic cycle. Main components of the diagnostic-therapeutic cycle are: 
observation, reasoning, and action. These stages are iterated until no further action 
needs to be taken, i.e. the patient no longer requires treatment [12]. 
The historical evolvement of heterogeneous IS in healthcare may be due to a lack 
of expertise in implementing systems, missing investment abilities, but also the 
development of technology needs to be taken into account [13]. 
Infection Control (IC) is the process of preventing hospital acquired infections 
(HAI) by isolating sources of infections and limiting their spread. Nowadays, HAI are 
by far the most common complications affecting hospitalized patients or intensive 
care patients [3, 5]. Approximately 2 million patients are affected each year and costs 
add up to estimated $4.5 to $5.7 billion per year [4]. Identification of HAI typically 
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involves testing of specimen in a laboratory. In addition, nurses working at nurse 
stations need to get specimen, physician need to order the specimen tests, and finally 
Infection Control Practitioners (ICP) need to ensure that all precautions have been 
taken, if a specimen was tested positive. 
4 A Case Study on Workflows in Healthcare 
4.1   Case Study Scenario 
The case was performed in a major healthcare facility in the U.S. The facility consists 
of multiple independent hospitals. More than 7500 employees are employed at four 
sites, medical staff counts around 1000 physicians throughout the organization. 
Overall, almost 1000 beds are available for inpatient care. The scope of the project 
was to analyze the current IC process, suggest possible improvements through 
workflow, and finally enhance the current IT solution to increase process efficiency. 
The uniqueness of this project was rooted in the application service providing (ASP) 
environment [6, 19]. 
The team for this subproject consisted of five method experts for process modeling 
and implementation and six domain experts at the healthcare facility for analysis, test, 
and evaluation. Staff for technical support (ASP, rule engine) was provided by the 
overall project management. Process modeling, implementation and pre- and post-
metrics took six month; build, test, and integration of the workflow needed to be done 
in only twelve weeks. 
Analog to the theoretically exploration in the previous sections, the actual freedom 
to restructure processes or the organization was found to heavily compromised by 
legal restrictions and health care guidelines. Although this became apparent already 
during the first stage of analysis, consensus was achieved to pursue the project even 
though potential for optimization could not be fully utilized. It was agreed that a 
workflow focused pilot project would provide essential knowledge for more complex 
projects to come. 
The software architecture is best described as a three tier, client server architecture 
built according to principles of service oriented architecture. The architecture consists 
of the web application tier, the top layer, constituted by web application servers 
running a user interface. The application tier, the middle layer, is constituted by 
application servers, a rules engine, and the WfMS. 
We used Soarian® as medical IS in this project [18]. The Soarian® environment 
uses the third part WfMS TIBCO® Staffware Process Suite [23]. The WfMS can use 
services provided by the medical IS to add and remove items to/from user specific 
worklists. Users of the medial IS can trigger events, hence invoke the workflow 
engine to perform actions on demand. Whereas the WfMS evaluates simple routing 
conditions by itself, complex clinical conditions need to be evaluated with respects to 
clinical knowledge and patient specific data. Therefore, a rules engine based on Arden 
Syntax [17] can be used by the WfMS. This rules engine evaluates complex decision 
in clinical workflows. 
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4.2   As-is Analysis 
The IC process at the customer consists of two separate process fragments, 
synchronized over paper reports. The first part of the process starts as soon as a 
specimen is tested, if the patient to which the specimen is assigned to, is an inpatient 
at the facility. First, the lab result needs to be checked whether it indicates a positive 
statement of a HAI. This is done by the laboratory, which has already performed the 
test of the specimen. Once a lab result indicating a positive infection statement has 
been identified, an employee working at the laboratory calls the floor the patient is 
located on. In doing so, the nurse station is notified about an infectious patient and 
responsibility for putting the patient in isolation is passed to the nurse station. After 
the nurse station has initiated necessary tasks to isolate the patient, the first part of the 
IC process ends, as soon as the laboratory has completed the documentation of the lab 
result in the lab system. The process depicted in Figure 1 illustrates a structured 
overview of this part of the IC process. 
 
Fig. 1. As-is notification process. 
The second part of the IC process is a rather a controlling process. U.S. hospitals 
are required to have ICP supervising the handling of infections at each facility. 
Furthermore, each hospital must report the amount of infection occurrences on a 
yearly basis [26]. As for this facility, specific reports for each infectious disease were 
created on a monthly or even daily basis. These reports are the starting point of the 
second fragment of the IC process (cf. Figure 2). Once a report of an infectious 
disease is received by an ICP, it needs to be checked for infection statements. This 
task results in a list of patients that need a follow-up ensuring that patients who 
require isolation are actually put in isolation. During daily tours, the ICP does not 
only check if infection precautions have been taken for infectious patients but also 
controls, if the infection statement is transferred to the patient’s chart. If a patient is 
not put in isolation, the ICP immediately initiates isolation. 
The analysis revealed the following intrinsic problem domains: Since reports of 
infectious diseases are generated every afternoon, even on weekends, and every 
Friday afternoon respectively, an ICP does only recognize infections the morning 
after the report has been generated. However, these reports are triggering the 
execution of the second part of the IC process. Hence, they are critical in time. 
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 Fig. 2. As-is follow-up process. 
The analysis of the IC process clearly revealed that no IT is used after the ICP has 
received infection reports. In addition, further investigations indicated that ICP did 
not have any access to the WfMS yet. The review of reports and patient charts needs 
to be done manually as infection reports are printed and corresponding patient charts 
are not at hand instantly. A sample inquiry performed in collaboration with ICP 
indicated that screening all necessary documents takes almost 30 % of ICP’s daily 
work time. 
Even though ICP have responsibility for the handling infectious diseases, they are 
not directly participating in the IC process. Further inquiry revealed that the former 
process was to leave a voicemail for the ICP, assigned to the nurse station the patient 
was located at, as soon as an infection disease was stated. Once the ICP received the 
voicemail, the isolation of infectious patients was initiated and controlled by the ICP. 
However, since ICP do not work nights or at weekends this process was changed to 
directly call the floor and notify ICP only through reports. In doing so, the customer 
reported faster turnaround times in putting patients in isolation even though 
notification of ICP was delayed, i.e. follow-up processes start delayed. 
4.3   To-be Analysis 
It became obvious that no change in matters of personnel capacities could be made. 
Neither could the involvement of ICP in notification tasks be increased nor could the 
controlling responsibilities of ICP transferred to an IS due to legal prerequisites [26]. 
The laboratory will still have to notify the nurse station directly, as ICP will, yet, not 
work during night hours or on weekends. In addition, it was agreed to not work on 
further improving the turnaround time for putting patients in isolation, but on the 
elimination of time wasted while generating, delivering, and reading reports as well as 
screening patient charts. In doing so, it was agreed to optimize IC tasks done by ICP 
without restructuring the organization or heavily affecting existing clinical and 
business processes. 
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Main focus was put on synchronizing the infection notification and the follow-up 
fragments of the as-is IC process (cf. Figures 1 and 2). The suggestion was to 
introduce a new workflow supported IC process. It was decided that a workflow 
should be used to screen new and modified lab results for statements of infectious 
diseases. Thereby, the lab system and the WfMS have been integrated in a way that 
every time a lab result is completed in the lab system, data is transferred. In doing so 
this data is available to users of the system in an instant. For a proper implementation 
of the integration events defined by Health Level 7 standards have been used. These 
events are incorporated in the workflow, which evaluates new and modified results 
and, furthermore, notifies ICP in case a positive infection statement is found. As the 
case study was a pilot project, it was agreed to limit the workflow to only cover two 
infections: clostridium difficile (CDIFF) and vancomycin resistant enterococcus 
(VRE). The workflow can be easily extended to cover other HAI, once clinical 
conditions have been identified and medical rules are created for an automated 
evaluation of those conditions. 
The uppermost part of Figure 3 illustrates the notification process of the to-be IC 
process. According to the agreement made with the customer, this part of the IC 
process was not changed at all. However, the linkage between the notification process 
and the infection follow-up is made explicit in the to-be process models. A message 
interface has been added to the notification process and to the follow-up process 
respectively. The follow-up process is started immediately after notification process 
and valuable process time is saved by synchronizing both processes parts. 
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Fig. 3. To-be notification process and to-be follow-up process. 
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More significant changes have been made to the infection follow-up process that is 
shown in the lowermost part of Figure 3. The process has been streamlined in order to 
allow efficient automation through the use of a workflow. To achieve the requested 
level of automation a WfMS has been introduced to the process. The follow-up 
process is triggered every time a lab result is documented in the lab system. The lab 
result is immediately evaluated through workflow. Only if the lab result either 
indicates a positive CDIFF or VRE statement, the ICP assigned to the nurse station 
the infectious patient is located at, will be notified. The notification, once again, is 
performed automatically through workflow. Hence, the ICP will instantly see a new 
task on his work list. The validation whether a patient has been put in isolation still 
needs to be done manually, but ICP are now able to access medical records 
electronically. This enables ICP to work independent of any paper reports or patient 
charts. Unfortunately, initiating the isolation of patients needs to be executed and 
monitored manually due to missing integration of participating actors (e.g., bed 
management). 
In consequence of extensively implementing the IC process with the use of IS, new 
possibilities for further process enhancement have been established. Utilizing new 
benefits, the to-be infection follow-up process was designed to be executed not only 
every time a lab result has been documented but also every time a patient is admitted 
as inpatient, an inpatient is pre-admitted, an outpatient is kept in hospital for 
observation or a patient requires emergency care. In either case, the last six month of 
the patient’s medical record are screened for an occurrence of an infection. If an 
infection statement was found within the past six months, the patient is considered to 
require isolation and infection precautions are taken. Since many HAI (e.g. VRE), are 
likely to reappear, if the last infection is more recent than six month, these new 
characteristics enabled the increase of process quality and patient safety in addition to 
the increase of efficiency. 
4.4   Implementation and Controlling 
The IC workflow is implemented based on a hierarchical model of procedures and 
sub-procedures. Thereby, the top level procedure is used to coordinate the overall 
process flow. The functionality to initiate new workflow instances (e.g., inpatient 
admit) and terminate existing instances (e.g., patient discharge) is built upon the 
workflow event handler. So called subscriptions which are basically rules that filter 
and evaluate selected events allow the definition of case generation and case 
termination respectively. The workflow has been implemented according to the to-be 
process models. Thus, a workflow case is initiated the first time a patient is admitted, 
pre-admitted, put in an observation bed or in the emergency department. The 
workflow instance will terminate as soon as the patient is sent home (cf. Figure 4). 
The purpose of the IC model workflow is to alert users of patients having 
infectious diseases (e.g., CDIFF, VRE). Therefore, the workflow is designed to 
immediately check new and modified lab results for patterns indicating a positive 
statement of an infectious disease. In addition, the workflow checks the medical 
record for a history of an infectious disease. Alerts on the work lists are created and 
patients are put on the census list of selected users (e.g., ICP), if a patients has an 
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active indication to be put in isolation. According to the to-be process the IC 
workflow is required and triggered by multiple events. 
Since every event provides a different set of data, the first three activities deal with 
consolidating data. This ensures that all workflow relevant data is available instantly. 
The sub-procedures PT discharge and PT discharge cancelled are used to perform a 
delayed workflow termination, if the patient was discharged and the discharge was 
not cancelled within eight hours. 
 
Fig. 4. Infection Control main procedure. 
Following the path to the VRE infection checking activities, a conditional router 
(invoked by VRE result?) is used to evaluate whether a lab result needs to be checked 
for VRE patterns or a patients medical record needs to be screened for positive VRE 
statements. Both, the checking of a lab result and history screen are performed in sub-
procedures. Thus, relevant data like patient identifiers, visit identifiers or result values 
must be passed to the called sub-procedure. Values returned by the sub-procedure 
must be mapped in the calling procedure. Once the VRE lab result has been evaluated 
automatically or the medical records has been screened for previous infections 
without human intervention, another conditional router is used to examine if a user 
needs to be alerted and if this patient needs to be added to the user’s census list. 
Alerting users and adding the patient to the census is automatically performed by 
another sub-procedure call. 
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Since the notification sub-procedure stays active until the alerted user confirms to 
have recognized the infection alert (e.g., user releases the alert) and new lab results 
may be submitted in between, there are cases where the alert message needs to be 
changed or the alert needs to be withdrawn entirely due to new information provided 
by new lab results. Therefore, functionality to remove or replace alerts is provided. 
This is done by withdrawing created alerts (e.g., withdraw connection of send VRE 
alert? and send VRE notification) before creating a new alert (wait for withdraw). 
Every time a patient is discharged from hospital all alerts will be removed and the 
patient will be dropped of the user’s census list. If a discharge is cancelled the status 
of the last notification will be restored. 
Concurrent to the project realization data was collected for a detailed analysis of 
the project outcome. The key metric defined in collaboration with the customer is 
time to notification. Time to notification as measurement of time, represents the time 
spent notifying an ICP of a newly identified infectious patient. In doing so, time 
measurement started as soon as a positive lab result had been documented by the 
laboratory. Time measurement stopped once an ICP had been notified. Data 
ascertainment of notification dates needed to be done manually. Before the 
implementation of the IC workflow, ICP were asked to write down dates as soon as 
they had been notified of infectious patients. After the workflow had been 
implemented the date of notification was considered to be the date when an ICP 
released the automatically created infection alert. 
Independent of the measurements of time to notification more data was collected in 
order to identify how much time was spent while screening paper reports or patient 
charts. Therefore, ICP were asked to write down hours spent on reading reports and 
screening patient charts before the implementation of the workflow. 95 cases were 
recorded over the course of two month each for pre- and post-measurement. 
The comparison of pre- and post-metrics reveals that time to notification was 
reduced by more than 75 % after the workflow had been implemented (cf. Table 1). 
Table 1. Comparison of post- and pre-measurements. 
 Average (VRE) Average (CDIFF) Overall Average 
Time to notification:  
pre-metrics 
150.00 h 25.68 h 69.68 h 
Time to notification:  
post-metrics 
20.67 h 15.68 h 16.99 h 
Difference 129.33 h 
   (86.22 %) 
10.00 h 
  (38.94 %) 
52.69 h 
 (75.61 %) 
 
Time to notification averaged out at 70 hours before the implementation and has 
reduced to an average of 17 hours after the implementation of the IC workflow. 
Although 17 hours still appears to be quite a lot, it is obvious that substituting the old 
paper reports based IC process for the new workflow supported IC process increased 
efficiency greatly. Furthermore, ICP spent an average of 30 % of their daily work 
time on screening infection reports and patient charts. This was decreased to almost 
zero after the implementation of the workflow, since required patient information is 
now available instantly through the integration of ICP to the WfMS. It has to be noted 
that before, VRE reports have only been created every Friday afternoon. This means, 
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that only those VRE occurrences of past Saturday to Friday would appear on Friday’s 
report, which is read on the following Monday at earliest. 
4 Conclusion and Next Steps 
In this paper we presented reasons for the inappropriateness of greenfield project 
approaches for the optimization of clinical processes in healthcare. 
The main restrictions, which hampered reengineering, originated from judicial and 
budgetary restrictions. Due to budgetary reasons, it was not possible to increase staff 
for weekend support or to include all departments (e.g., bed management). Due to 
judicial restriction, pagers and e-mail were not available at the time because of 
increased IT test requirements. Furthermore, it was not intended to touch existing IS 
(e.g., laboratory IS). Several laws or certifications required certain procedures. 
Significant restrictions impose the certification requirements of The Joint 
Commission (JCAHO) [20] as it entails implementing the hygiene guidelines of the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Public Health Service Act 
[24]. As a consequence, it was, e.g., not possible to transfer authority for ICP to an IS. 
Still, significant potential for automating coordination and evaluation task (e.g., 
calling floors, screening charts) was discovered, utilized and in consequence 
contributed to patient safety without radically redesigning the organization. 
Improvements were made through the implementation of HAI history screening, as 
every inpatient, now, is screened for a positive history. The process quality has been 
improved through reducing the risk of human errors, since ICP no longer rely on 
manually generated paper reports or voicemails. The implementation of the workflow 
greatly contributed to the process of getting health workers, especially ICP, online. It 
was observed that the automated IC process was functioning as incentive to overcome 
the negative attitude some health workers might have concerning IT in inpatient care. 
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Abstract. Recent analysis of clinical Computer-Interpretable Guideline (CIG)
modelling languages from the perspective of the control-flow patterns has re-
vealed limited capabilities of these languages to provide flexibility for encoding
and executing clinical guidelines. The concept of flexibility is of major impor-
tance in the medical-care domain since no guarantee can be given on predicting
the state of patients at the point of care. In this paper, we illustrate how the flexibil-
ity of CIG modelling languages can be improved by describing clinical guidelines
using a declarative approach. We propose a CIGDec language for modelling and
enacting clinical guidelines.
Keywords: Clinical guidelines, Computer-interpretable guidelines, flexibility, mod-
elling languages, declarative model specification,temporal logic.
1 Introduction
Clinical Computer-Interpretable Guidelines (CIG) impact clinician behavior (i.e., qual-
ity of patient care, costs, etc.) to a great extent when they are implemented as comput-
erized guidelines that deliver patient-specic recommendations during patient encoun-
ters [1]. A number of guideline modelling languages have been developed to represent
guidelines in a machine and human understandable format that enables guideline execu-
tion. Control-ow perspective of guidelines signicantly inuences the clinical behav-
ior, because it determines the order of actions in medical treatments. Other perspectives
(e.g., a model of patient data including temporal data, a model of medical actions and
decisions, etc.) add more contextual details to the control-ow perspective, determin-
ing the exact favorable clinical behavior. Unfortunately, due to the absence of a single
standard for developing CIG modelling languages, the functionality of decision-support
systems employing such modelling languages from the perspective of the control-ow
differs to a great extent.
We analyzed the suitability of four modelling languages Asbru, PROforma, GLIF
and EON for expressing control-ow patterns [2] and revealed that these languages do
not offer more control-ow exibility than process modelling languages employed by
the Workow Management Systems (WFMS) [3]. This is remarkable since one would
expect CIG modelling-languages to offer dedicated constructs allowing for more build-
time and runtime exibility. Accommodating flexibility into guidelines means that the
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CIG would be sensitive to the characteristics of specic patients and specic health care
organizations [4].
The modelling languages we analyzed explicitly model a care process by specifying
the steps and the order in which these steps are to be executed. Although process lan-
guages allow for some exibility by means of modelling alternative paths, any of which
could be taken depending on some a-priori available data, they are incapable of han-
dling exceptional or unpredicted situations. Exceptional situations have to be modelled
explicitly. However, modelling of all possible scenarios results in complex models and
is not feasible since exceptional situations and emergencies may arise at any point in
time. This makes it difcult or even impossible to oversee what activity should be per-
formed next. To overcome these problems, i.e. reduce the complexity of models, and
to allow for more exibility in selecting an execution path, in this paper we propose
CIGDec as a declarative language for modelling clinical guidelines. Unlike imperative
languages, declarative languages specify the what task should be performed without
determining of the how to perform it. CIGDec species by means of constraints the
rules that should be adhered to by a user during a process execution while leaving a lot
of freedom to the user in selecting tasks and dening the order in which they can be
executed. CIGDec can be considered as a variant of ConDec [5] and DecSerFlow [6].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce CIG
modelling languages Asrbu, GLIF, EON and PROforma using a patient-diagnosis sce-
nario. In Section 3 we introduce CIGDec and illustrate a CIGDec model of the patient-
diagnosis scenario. We discuss the drawbacks and advantages of the proposed language
in Section 4. Related work is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Computer-Interpretable Guidelines
This section describes the main concepts of four well-known CIG modelling languages:
Asbru, EON, GLIF, and PROforma. These have been evaluated from the control-ow
perspective using the workow patterns [7]. We introduce the main concepts of these
languages by modelling the following patient diagnosis scenario in the tools Asbru-
View, Protege-2000 (for EON and GLIF) and Tallis respectively. A patient is registered
at a hospital, after which he is consulted by a doctor. The doctor directs the patient to
pass a blood test and urine test. When the results of both tests become available, the
doctor sets the diagnosis and denes the treatment strategy.
While specifying the behavior of the scenario, we immediately reect on the pos-
sibilities to deviate from this scenario required for example in an emergency case. In
particular, we indicate whether it is possible to skip a patient registration step and im-
mediately start with the diagnosis; to perform multiple tests of the same kind or perform
only one of them; and to perform the consultancy by the doctor after performing one of
the tests again. Next to it, we indicate the degree of support of the control-ow patterns
by the analyzed modelling languages. Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the CIG
modelling languages from the perspective of the control-ow patterns [7]. The com-
plete description of the patterns and how they are supported by the analyzed languages
can be found in [8, 3] respectively.
Figure 1 presents the scenario modelled in AsbruView, which is a markup tool de-
veloped to support authoring of guidelines in Asbru [9]. A process model in Asbru
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Basic Control–flow 1 2 3 4 New Patterns 1 2 3 4
1. Sequence + + + + 21. Structured Loop + + + +
2. Parallel Split + + + + 22. Recursion + - - -
3. Synchronization + + + + 23. Transient Trigger - - - +
4. Exclusive Choice + + + + 24. Persistent Trigger - - + +
5. Simple Merge + + + + 25. Cancel Region - - - -
Advanced Branching and Synchronization 26. Cancel Multiple Instance Activity + - + +
6. Multi-choice + + + + 27. Complete Multiple Instance Activity + - - +
7. Structured Synchronizing Merge +/- - - + 28. Blocking Discriminator - - - -
8. Multi-merge - - - - 29. Cancelling Discriminator + - - +
9. Structured Discriminator + + + + 30. Structured N-out-of-M Join + - + +
Structural Patterns 31. Blocking N-out-of-M Join - - - -
10. Arbitrary Cycles - + + - 32. Cancelling N-out-of-M Join - - - +
11. Implicit Termination + + + + 33. Generalized AND-Join - - - -
Multiple Instances Patterns 34. Static N-out-of-M Join for MIs - - - -
12. MI without Synchronization - - - - 35. Static N-out-of-M Join for MIs with Canc. - - - -
13. MI with a priori Design Time Knowledge +/- +/- +/- +/- 36. Dynamic N-out-of-M Join for MIs - - - -
14. MI with a priori Run-Time Knowledge - - - - 37. Acyclic Synchronizing Merge - - - +
15. MI without a priori Run-Time Knowledge - - - - 38. General Synchronizing Merge - - - -
State-Based Patterns 39. Critical Section + - + -
16. Deferred Choice + - + + 40. Interleaved Routing + - + -
17. Interleaved Parallel Routing + - - - 41. Thread Merge - - - -
18. Milestone - - - + 42. Thread Split - - - -
Cancellation Patterns 43. Explicit Termination - - - -
19. Cancel Activity + + + +
20. Cancel Case + - +/- +
Table 1. Support for the Control–flow Patterns in (1)Asbru, (2)EON, (3)GLIF, and (4)PROforma
[10] is represented by means of a time-oriented skeletal plan. Skeletal plans are plan
schemata at various levels of detail, which capture the essence of the procedure, but
leave room for execution-time exibility. The root plan A is composed of a set of other
plans that are represented as 3-dimensional objects, where the width represents the time
axis, the depth represents plans on the same level of the decomposition (i.e. which are
performed in parallel), and the height represents the decomposition of plans into sub-
plans.
 
Fig. 1. The patient-diagnosis scenario modelled in Asbru
As the time axis shows, plans Register patient, Consult with doctor, Test phase
and Define the treatment are executed sequentially. The Test phase is a parallel plan
consisting of two activities ask for urine test and ask for blood test. The parallel plan
requires all enclosed plans to be completed in order to pass the ow of control to the
next plan. In this model, only two types of plans were used: sequential (root plan) and
parallel plan (Test phase plan). In AbsruView plans of type: Any-order, Unordered,
Cyclical, and If-then-else, and actions of type: Ask and Variable Assignment can be
visualized.
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Deviations from the modelled scenario are not possible in AsbruView, since all
plans are structured and their order is strictly dened. It would be possible to adjust the
model and implicitly incorporate all required execution paths. In particular, the Cyclical
Plan should be used in order to iterate the execution of a certain task. In order to relax
the parallel order of the blood- and urine-tests’ tasks, an Any-order Plan could be used.
However, the behavior of the model would be still deterministic and not allow for much
exibility. In Asbru there is a concept of plan activation mode. It allows conditions for
aborting, suspending and resuming a plan. This can be relevant for the case of regis-
tering a patient and not having all the needed data initially: a plan is suspended and
later resumed. As the pattern-based analysis showed [3], Asbru is able to support 20
out of 43 control-ow patterns. Asbru uniquely supports the recursive calls and inter-
leaved parallel routing, which are the features not directly supported by other analyzed
languages.
Main modelling entities in EON [11] are scenarios, action steps, branching, deci-
sions, and synchronization [12, 13]. A scenario is used to characterize the state of a
patient. There are two types of Decision steps in EON, i.e. a Case step (select precisely
one branch) and a Choice step (select at least one branch). An Action step is used to
specify a set of action specications or a sub-guideline that are to be carried out. Branch
and Synchronization steps are used to specify parallel execution. We omit EON model
since it is very similar to model created in GLIF (see Fig. 2).
The following features offered by EON can be used in order to make the model of
the patient-diagnosis scenario more exible. A Scenario can be used to model different
entry points to the model. This allows to jump into the middle of the model and to
start execution from that point. This feature is useful for emergency cases where for
example a registration step has to be skipped and immediate treatment procedure has
to be started. Unfortunately, EON offers not much exibility with respect to synchro-
nization of multiple branches, i.e. it allows the define treatment task to be executed only
if a single or all branches have been executed. However, it is incapable of predicting
how many branches were selected and performing a partial synchronization after all se-
lected branches were executed. From all analyzed modelling languages, EON supports
the lowest number of the control-ow patterns, i.e. only 11 out of 43.
GLIF3.5 [14] is a specication method for structured representation of guidelines.
To create a model in GLIF, an ontology schema and a graph widget have to be loaded
into the Protege-2000 environment. Figure 2(a) visualizes the GLIF model of the basic
patient-diagnosis scenario. In GLIF3.5 ve main modelling entities are used for process
modelling, i.e. an Action Step, a Branch Step, a Decision Step, a Patient-State Step, and
a Synchronization Step. An Action Step is a block for specifying a set of tasks to be
performed, without constraints set on the execution order. It allows for including sub-
guidelines into the model. Decision steps are used for conditional and unconditional
routing of the ow to one out of multiple steps. Branch and Synchronization steps are
used for modelling concurrent steps. A Patient-State Step is a guideline step used for
describing a patient state and for specifying an entry point(s) to a guideline.
In order to allow the behavior of the basic patient-diagnosis scenario shown in Fig-
ure 2(a) to deviate, all possible pathes have to be explicitly modelled. Figure 2(b) rep-
resents a scenario, in which Register patient step can be done in parallel to any other
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step, but it has to be exactly once to complete the process (if more than once is desired,
an iteration condition for Register patient step can be added which resembles a while
loop: while not all patient data has been entered, repeat Register Patient. In this sce-
nario, a decision can be taken to order tests or to proceed to treatment without tests.
However, treatment or ordering of tests cannot be done before consulting with a doctor.
One or two tests can be ordered before proceeding to treatment. Figure 2(b) shows how
complex the model has become after we introduced several deviations from the basic
scenario. Thus, this specication needs to model graphically all the possible paths of
execution, and it is not very scalable.
(a) (b)
   
Fig. 2. The patient-diagnosis scenario modelled in GLIF3.5/Protege
Similar to EON, GLIF allows multiple entry points into the model to be specied
by means of the Patient-State step. This allows the execution to start from any point
where a patient enters a scenario model while skipping tasks-predecessors. GLIF offers
more variants for synchronizing parallel branches, i.e. to synchronize after one, sev-
eral or all tasks have been completed. However, GLIF is incapable of synchronizing
branches when it is unknown which branches and how many of them will be chosen.
This explains why the number of control-ow patterns supported by GLIF (17 out of
43) is bigger than in EON but still smaller than Asbru.
PROforma [15] is a formal knowledge representation language for authoring, pub-
lishing and executing clinical guidelines. It deliberately supports a minimal set of mod-
elling constructs: actions, compound plans, decisions, and enquiries that can be used as
tasks in a task network. In addition, a keystone may be used to denote a generic task in
a task network. All tasks share attributes describing goals, control ow, preconditions,
and postconditions. A model of the basic patient-diagnosis scenario created in Tallis
is shown in Figure 3(a). Note that in PROforma control-ow behavior is captured by
modelling constructs in combination with the scheduling constraints. Scheduling con-
straints are visualized as arrows connecting two tasks, meaning that the task at the tail
of the arrow may become enabled only after the task at the head of the arrow has com-
pleted. To deviate from the basic scenario, some of the scheduling constraints should
be removed as it is shown in Figure 3(b).
In contrast to all examined languages, PROforma allows for late modelling, i.e. if it
is not clear in advance what steps exactly should be performed, these steps are modelled
by means of keystones, which are substituted by a desired type of the task before the
model is deployed. Furthermore, by means of triggers it is possible to specify that a task
has to be performed even if the task’s preconditions were not satised. PROforma also
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Fig. 3. The patient-diagnosis scenario modelled in PROforma/Tallis
allows for more exibility during the synchronization of multiple paths, thus it is able
to predict how many paths from the available ones were selected and to merge them
when they have completed. Furthermore, scheduling constraints in PROforma are not
obligatory. This means that stand-alone tasks may be activated upon the fulllment of
a pre-condition. PROforma has the highest degree of pattern-support from all analyzed
languages, i.e. it supports 22 out of 43 patterns.
The medical community has always emphasized that it is impossible to use work-
ow formalisms because of specic requirements such as exibility. However, when we
examined guideline modelling languages we didn’t nd more exibility than in todays
workow and BPM products. Given a large variety of process modelling languages
nowadays it makes no sense to develop more complicated language which would sup-
port more control-ow patterns. Instead, we take a completely new approach and pro-
pose a CIGDec language for encoding clinical guidelines.
3 Declarative description of clinical guidelines
In this section we present the CIGDec declarative language and show benets of apply-
ing it for modeling clinical guidelines.
Modelers who use traditional CIG modelling languages have to represent all pos-
sible scenarios (normal and exceptional) that can occur during the execution. Such a
model has to include all possible scenarios that can occur during the execution. This
means that CIG modelers have to predict in detail all possible execution paths in ad-
vance for the guideline they are modelling. The model itself tends to be very complex
and strictly predenes all relationships between all steps in the guideline. Such a model
not only prescribes to users what to do, but it also contains a detailed specication about
how to do it. Hence, traditional CIG modelling languages are of an imperative nature.
CIGDec is a declarative language, i.e., its models specify what to do and leave it
up to the user to decide how to work depending on the case. CIGDec models do not
require all possible scenarios to be predicted in advance. On the contrary, the model
consists of a set of tasks and some dependencies (relationships) between these tasks.
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Dependencies between tasks can be seen as some general rules that should always hold
in the guideline. Any task in the model can be performed by a user if and only if none
of the specied rules is violated. As an extreme example, a CIGDec model that consists
only of a set of tasks without dependencies would represent a completely free guideline,
where a user can execute any task in any desired order. As more rules in the model as
less possibilities to deviate from a certain execution order is given to the user. Therefore,
rules constrain the model. Hence, we refer to dependencies between tasks (rules) as to
constraints.
Any CIG model consists of a set of tasks and some relationships between them
specifying the exact order of tasks. Typically, traditional languages use a predened set
of constructs that can be used to dene relations between tasks: 1) sequence, 2) choice,
3) parallelism, and 4) iteration. These constructs are used to dene the exact control-
ow (order of tasks) in the guideline. In CIGDec, this set of constructs is unlimited, i.e.,
constructs can be added, changed and removed, depending on the requirements of the
application, domain, users, etc. We refer to constructs used for dening possible types
of dependencies between tasks in CIGDec as to constraint templates. Each template
has its semantics, which is formally represented by one Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
formula. This semantics is used for the computerized enactment of the guideline [5].
LTL is extensively used in the eld of model checking, where the target model is veried
against properties specied in LTL [16, 17]. For computerized enactment of CIGDec
model we use algorithms for translating LTL expressions into automata developed in
the model checking eld [18, 6, 5]. Since LTL formulas can be very complex and hard
to understand, each template also has unique graphical representation for users. In this
way, we ensure that CIGDec users do not have to be LTL experts in order to work with
models [5]. Although the set of templates is ‘open’, we propose a starting collection of
eleven templates in [19].
When looking at a traditional CIG model, one usually tries to nd the starting point
and then follows the control-ow until the end point is reached. This cannot be applied
to CIGDec models. Constructs (lines) do not necessarily describe the order of tasks, but
rather various dependencies between them. In our starting set of constraint templates we
distinguish between two types of templates: ‘existence’ (unary) templates, and binary
templates that can represent a ‘relation’ or ‘negative relation’.
‘Existence’ templates are unary templates because they involve only one task. Gen-
erally, they dene the cardinality (possible number of executions) of the task. Binary
templates involve two tasks. For example, a special line between tasks might mean that
these two tasks include each other (e.g., ‘co-existence’ template between tasks A and B
species that if A happens then B happens and vice versa, without specifying in which
order). The ‘responded existence’ constraint species that if one task is performed then
the other task before or after the rst one. There are also some binary templates that
consider the order of activities. One example is the ‘response’ template, which species
that the a given task has to be performed at least once after the other task has been com-
pleted. Note that in all these examples it was possible to have an arbitrary execution of
other tasks between the two related tasks.
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3.1 CIGDec model for the diagnosis scenario
Figure 4 depicts a CIGDec model of our patient-diagnosis scenario. It consists of ve
tasks. In an extreme case, it would be possible to make and use the model consisting
only out of these tasks and without any constraints. This would be a unrestricted model
allowing for maximum exibility, where tasks could be executed an arbitrary number of
times (‘0..*’) and in any order. This model would have an innite number of execution
possibilities (different process instances). However, to develop a model that provides
guidance, we add ve constraints derived from three constraint templates.
Fig. 4. CIGDec model for the diagnosis scenario.
First, there is one unary (involving one task) constraint created from the template
‘existence’ - constraint presented as cardinality 1..* above the task register patient. This
constraint species that the task register patient has to be executed at least once within
one process (guideline) enactment.
Second, there are two constraints created from the template ‘precedence’ as shown
in Figure 4: one between tasks consult doctor and blood test and one between tasks
consult doctor and urine test. Precedence is a binary template, i.e., it denes a depen-
dency between two tasks. A ‘precedence’ between two tasks A and B means that task B
can only be executed after task A was executed at least once [6]. It is possible that other
tasks are executed between A and B. Hence, if we want to execute task blood test we
can do so only after we have executed task consult doctor. Note that other tasks from
the model can be executed between consult doctor and blood test. Task test urine also
has a ‘precedence’ relation with task consult doctor and it can be executed only after
task consult doctor. Similarly, there could be other tasks between them. Moreover, the
doctor may be consulted multiple times before and after doing the tests.
Third, we use a binary template ‘response’ to create two constraints: one between
tasks blood test and treatment and one between tasks urine test and treatment. Template
‘response’ between tasks A and B denes that after every execution of task A task B has
to be executed at least once while it is possible that other tasks are executed between A
and B. Thus, after every blood test at least one treatment should follow, and there could
be other tasks from the model executed between them. The same holds for tasks urine
test and treatment.
The possibilities given to a user during execution of the model depicted in Figure 4
are dened as a combination of all ve constraints in the model. When looking at the
models designed by means of the analyzed language Asbru, the execution always had
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to start with the task register patient. This may cause problems in cases of emergency,
when there is no time for the registration requiring the procedure with doctor (task
consult doctor) to start immediately. While in EON and GLIF allow multiple entry-
points to a scenario, these entrance steps have to be modelled explicitly. In PROforma a
task can be modelled without use of scheduling constraints which allows this task to be
executed at any moment. Note however, that the CIG languages assume that a task can
be executed once during the model execution or iteratively a specied number of times.
In CIGDec model a patient-registration step can be performed at any moment during
the CIGDec process. Furthermore, CIGDec model allows to perform register patient
multiple times in case the required data is not available on time.
If we look at the traditional models Figures 1, 2 and 3 (i.e. mode using Absru and
EON, GLIF and PROforma), task consult doctor was executed exactly once. CIGDec
model allows this task not to be executed at all, but it also allows it to be executed
multiple times. For example, some patients use medication periodically. For them only
the treatment task has to be performed either before or after the register patient has
been executed. On the other hand, in some complex cases, task consult doctor can be
performed more than once at various points during the CIGDec execution.
If necessary, a doctor can order a blood test many times or not at all during the
CIGDec process. However, constraint ‘precedence’ between this task and consult doc-
tor makes sure that blood test can not be done for a patient that has not seen the doctor
before. Note that his holds only for the rst blood test. Sometimes, the results can be
unexpected and doctor can order a different type of blood test without having to see
the patient again. After every blood test, task treatment is performed. It is possible that
during treatment no medication is prescribed due to the good test results. However,
it is also possible to wait and to perform several blood tests in order to make an in-
formed decision before the task treatment is performed. Since task urine test has the
same relationships as task blood test (‘precedence’ with consult doctor and ‘response’
with treatment), the same variants of execution paths hold like for the task blood test.
However, note that none of the tasks ‘blood test’ and ‘urine test’ do not have to execute
at all, or each of them can be executed one or more times, or only one of them can be
executed one or more times.
CIGDec model from Figure 4 could be used to realize the following scenarios. First,
in the ‘case A’ a periodical medication is prescribed to a chronic patient: only register
patient and treatment tasks are executed. In the ‘case B’ an urgent visit starts directly
with consult doctor and only afterwards the task register patient is executed. The urine
test was not necessary. The results of the blood test were unclear so the treatment is
executed only after the results of the second blood test became available and an addi-
tional consult doctor task. In the ‘case C’, the situation was not urgent, so task register
patient was performed before the task consult doctor. Both urine test and blood test are
performed. However, due to alarming results of the urine test an immediate treatment
was executed to prescribe appropriate medication. The results of blood test arrived later,
and an additional treatment task was executed to handle the blood test results as well.
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4 Discussion
We have shown that CIGDec can be used to dene the degree of exibility given to a
user during the process execution. We have also indicated that a degree of the absolute
exibility can be reached by leaving out all constraints resulting in the freedom given
to a user to select any task and execute tasks in any desired order. Since the degree
of exibility has to be controlled in the context of medical care in order to adhere to
strict and desirable recommendations, the mandatory and optional constraints have to
specied for a modelled guideline. To control the adherence to the specied constraints,
the execution engine CIGDec prohibits the violation of the mandatory constraints while
allowing the optional constraints to be neglected. All user steps that might result in the
violation of constraints are communicated to a user by means of warnings.
The advantages of the proposed CIGDec-based approach over the analyzed mod-
elling languages that employ the imperative approach are as follows:
• CIGDec enables the flexibility in selection, meaning that a user executing a model
specied in CIGDec gets a freedom in choosing an execution sequence, without
requiring this sequence to be thought of in advance and explicitly modelled during
the design-time.
• CIGDec enables late binding, meaning that it allows to choose an appropriate task
at the point of care. This feature is particular important in modelling of CIG since it
is not always possible to predict what steps will need to be executed, thus the task
selection is case-dependent.
• CIGDec ensures the absence of change, meaning that it prohibits choices of users
that would violate mandatory constraints.
• CIGDec allows for extendability and allows new LTL formulas to be introduced,
thus applicability of CIGDec could be tailored to a specic situation.
The disadvantages of using CIGDec are as follows:
• If a process to be modelled has to be very strict and should allow for exibility,
then the use of CIGDec may result in a complex model.
• CIGDec aims at the modelling of rather small processes, since the description of
large processes (containing approximately several thousands of tasks) becomes dif-
cult to understand.
Since both imperative and declarative languages have disadvantages, in order to im-
prove the exibility of the CIG modelling languages we recommend to augment the
CIG languages with the features offered by CIGDec.
5 Related Work
The recent Workflow Patterns initiative [2] has taken an empirical approach to identi-
fying the most common control constructs inherent to modelling languages adopted by
workow systems. In particular, a broad survey of modelling languages resulted in 20
workow patterns being identied [7]. In this paper we have used the revised set of the
control-ow patterns [8] to evaluate CIS’s modelling languages.
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There had been many attempts to enrich the exibility of workow (process) man-
agement systems. Case-handling systems are systems that offer more exility by focus-
ing on the whole case (process instance), instead of individual tasks [20]. An example
of such a system is FLOWer [21], where users can ‘move up and down’ the process by
opening, sipping and re-doing tasks, rather than just executing tasks. Although users
have a major inuence on execution in FLOWer, their actions are seen as going back-
wards or forward in a traditional process model. Moreover, this might some unwanted
side-effects. For example, if the user wishes to execute again (re-do) an earlier task,
s(he) will also have to execute again (re-do) all tasks that followed it. Unlike in FLOWer,
deviations are not seen as an exception in CIGDec but as ‘normal’ behavior while the
process instance unfolds further according to the choices of users.
Flexibility of process enactment tools is greatly increased by their adaptivity. ADEPT
is an example of an adaptive system where users can change the process model during
the enactment [22]. ADEPT is a powerful tool which enables users to insert, move and
delete tasks form the process instance they are currently working on. However, the user
has to be a process modelling expert in order to change the model. Moreover, in med-
ical domain cases may have many differences and adaptations would be too frequent
and time consuming. CIGDec does not see deviations as changes in the model and a
good-designed CIGDec model can cover a wide variety of cases.
One of a promising ways to introduce exibility is to replace imperative by declar-
ative. Various declarative languages describe the dependency relationships between
tasks, rather than procedurally describing sequences of action [23]. Generally, declar-
ative languages propose modeling constraints that drive the model enactment [2325].
Constraints describe dependencies between model elements. Constraints are specied
using pre and post conditions for target task [25], dependencies between states of tasks
(enabled, active, ready, etc.) [23] or various model-related concepts [24].
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a declarative approach which could be applied to over-
come problems experienced by the imperative languages used for modelling clinical
guidelines. In particular, we have shown how by means of applying the CIGDec lan-
guage more exibility in selection can be achieved than the considered CIG modelling
languages offer. Furthermore, we showed how the model declared in CIGDec can be
enacted. In addition, we discussed differences between the proposed declarative and
analyzed imperative languages, their advantages and disadvantages, and made a propo-
sition to combine the features of imperative and declarative approaches in order to in-
crease their applicability and usability.
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Abstract.  We put forward an architectural framework that promotes the exter-
nalisation of the social dimension that arises in software-intensive systems 
which, like in healthcare, exhibit interactions between humans (social compo-
nents) and technical components (devices, computer-based systems, and so on) 
that are critical for the domain in which they operate.  Our framework is based 
on a new class of architectural connectors (social laws) that provide mecha-
nisms through which the biddability of human interactions can be taken into 
account and the sub-ideal situations that result from the violation of organisa-
tional norms can be modelled and acted upon by reconfiguring the socio-
technical systems.  Our approach is based on formal, algebraic graph-based rep-
resentations and transformations. 
1 Introduction 
One of the main sources of difficulties in healthcare oriented process management is 
the fact that staff may deviate from prescribed medical or organisational workflows.  
Such deviations are not “errors” but, rather, result from the fact that situations may 
arise in which humans may need to interact with machines in “sub-ideal” states [17]: 
“Medical personnel must be free to react and is trained to do so. 
Therefore, in addition to the customization of a pathway schema at in-
stance creation time, it must be possible to dynamically adapt in-
progress treatment cases (i.e., process instances) during runtime. […] 
As a consequence the actual patient treatment process may deviate 
from the original treatment plan and the related medical pathway re-
spectively. However, such deviations from the pre-planned process 
must not lead to errors or inconsistencies”. 
Freedom to (re)act matches perfectly the characteristics of biddable domains as 
identified by Jackson [16]: “[people] can be joined to adhere to certain behaviour, 
but may or may not obey the injunction”.  The problem, as highlighted in the quote 
above, is to endow systems with the degree of flexibility that allows them to adapt 
dynamically to changes from ideal to sub-ideal states. 
In this paper, we explore the use of architectural modelling techniques for making 
systems adaptable through dynamic reconfiguration [2].  Such techniques rely on the 
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externalisation of the coordination of the interactions among components of the sys-
tem in explicit connectors [1].  One can then reconfigure the system by changing the 
connectors without changing the components themselves.  However, in order to be 
able to address interactions in which some of the components are human, as is the 
case in healthcare, we need new modelling primitives that extend the notion of con-
nector.  For instance, we should be able to model the interactions that, in a healthcare 
system, are associated with the roles performed by medical staff when engaging with 
fellow staff, software applications or machines. 
Our approach addresses what are sometimes called “socio-technical systems”: sys-
tems that include a “social dimension” in the sense that people (or groups of people) 
need to be considered not as external users but as another class of components that, 
together with software and devices, perform roles that are vital for the “good” behav-
iour of the system.  In order to bring human interaction within the boundaries of sys-
tems, we need to be able to refer to normative concepts like permissions, obligations 
and power, and to model the violations that can take place so that processes and un-
derlying software can be reconfigured to react to non-normative situations in ways 
that ensure agreed, possibly minimal, levels of service.  In this paper, we are particu-
larly interested in capturing sub-ideal situations that are caused by violating an obli-
gation or a permission to perform a certain action or activity.  
From this discussion, it should be obvious that our approach differs from the per-
spective on human interaction taken in HCI (Human-Computer Interactions), which 
addresses user interface issues, or CSCW (Computer Supported Cooperative Work) 
[], which tackles person-to-person computer-mediated collaborations.  Our focus is 
not on user interaction but on peer-to-peer interactions.  Our starting point is a com-
bination of recent work on software architecture [2] and the knowledge that has been 
accumulated in multidisciplinary areas of research such as deontic logic [22], multi-
agent systems [10], role-based access control [21] and other social studies.  In [8], we 
made a preliminary proposal for a new class of architectural primitives and formal 
configuration modelling techniques based on [24].  These configuration primitives 
allow us to specify when and how to reconfigure the software architecture, at runtime, 
in a way that reflects the normative positions of humans as engaged in interactions 
within organisational settings.  In this paper, we provide an overview of this work as 
applied to healthcare and develop in more detail the semantics of the reconfiguration 
operations. 
Section 2 constitutes a brief discussion of the architectural modelling approach and 
addresses the new primitives, through which biddable interactions can be coordi-
nated, then after.  Section 3 provides a mathematical semantics over graph-based 
representations and transformations followed by an example.   
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2 The Architectural Approach 
2.1 Architectural Primitives for Causal Interactions 
Our architectural framework is based on the CCC architectural approach [2, 3], which 
includes a business micro-architecture to support engineers and system specifiers to 
model and implement evolving component-base systems.  Architectural primitives 
like coordination contracts [2] model rules that determine how and when components 
need to interact in order to fulfil business requirements.  The CCC can be classified as 
a coordination based approach [13] that borrows essential ideas from software archi-
tecture [19] in order to externalise interactions from computations, and superimposi-
tion as known from parallel program design [12] to support compositional evolution.  
Indeed, in software architecture, modelling techniques have been proposed for 
supporting interaction-centric approaches.  More precisely, such techniques promote 
interconnections to first-class citizens (architectural connectors) by separating the 
code that, in traditional approaches, is included in the components for handling the 
way they interact with the rest of the system, from the code that is responsible for the 
computations that are responsible for the services offered by the components.  
The particular architectural approach that is adopted by the CCC builds on event-
condition-action (ECA) rules for coordinating the joint behaviour that a group of 
components need to execute in reaction to a trigger generated by another component 
or outside the system.  A so-called coordination law defines how a number of partners 
interact.  The partners are not named: they are abstracted as coordination interfaces 
that define types of system entities in terms of operations that instance entities need to 
make available and events that need to be observed.  As an example, consider the 
coordination of the way a doctor interacts with a respiratory-control system:  
 coordination interface respiratory-control 
  partner type DEVICE 
  types a:pressure, d:DOCTOR 
  operations 
    in-charge(d):Boolean 
    verify():pressure 
    decrease(a): post verify() = old verify()-a 
    increase(a): post verify() = old verify()+a 
 coordination interface doctor-in-charge  
  partner type DOCTOR 
  types a: pressure 
  events plus(a), minus(a) 
 coordination law restricted-respiratory 
  partners d: doctor-in-charge, r: respiratory-control  
  types a:pressure  
  attributes min,max:pressure 
  rules 
    when d.minus(a) 
       with r.verify-a≥min and r.in-charge(d) 
       do r.decrease(a) 
    when d.plus(a) 
        with r.verify+a•max and r.in-charge(d) 
           do r.increase(a) 
      
Each rule of the coordination law identifies, under the “when” clause, a trigger to 
which the instances of the law will react – e.g. a request by a doctor for an increase or 
decrease of the pressure.  The trigger can be just an event observed directly over one 
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of the partners or a more complex condition built from one or more events.  Under the 
“with” clause, we include conditions (guards) that should be observed for the reaction 
to be performed: that the changes in the pressure keep it within the specified bounds 
and that the doctor has been authorised to be in charge of the device.  If any of the 
conditions fails, the reaction is not performed and the occurrence of the trigger fails.  
Explicit mechanisms can be defined for handling such failures. 
There is neither a provision in the CCC approach, nor in any other architectural 
approach that we know, to model interactions that are only biddable, i.e. situations in 
which people (social components) are requested to perform given operations but the 
system cannot cause (force) them to perform these operations.  For instance, biddable 
interaction would occur if the doctor would be requested to alter the current settings. 
In summary, one needs a richer model of interaction that can capture the fact that 
coordination in the presence of social components cannot be causal.   
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Figure 1: A CCC-based configuration  
2.2 Architectural Primitives for Biddable Interactions 
The social layer that is required for healthcare requires integrating a new collection of 
architectural primitives that support the modelling of human interactions in ways that 
are flexible and easily amenable to change.  More precisely, for the kind of “just-in-
time” binding and reconfigurations required for modelling biddability of human par-
ticipants, we put forward another class of connector types (social laws) defined over a 
set of social roles, each of which represents the abilities of a social entity within the 
organisation. 
2.2.1   Social Roles 
Roles are abstract constructs that specify the behaviour expected of social compo-
nents by means of operations and ascribed normative aspects that refer to certain 
institutionalised positions or capabilities.  More concretely, we distinguish between 
having the ability to perform an operation and having the qualification or authorisa-
tion to do so: a social component may have the ability to perform an operation and 
still trigger a role violation if it is not an instance of a role that has the right qualifica-
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tion.  Here we use the word qualification to mean, for instance, that the organisation 
has empowered the social component to perform given operations.   
As discussed below, the execution of operations by a component when playing a 
role without the required qualification is governed by a social law.  A social law 
specifies (social) rules that either impose sanctions or provide a configuration in 
which the operation can be safely executed, depending on the context in which the 
violation takes place.  However, we need to stress that the execution of operations, 
even if by qualified components, can be governed by coordination laws and, as such, 
be refused in certain circumstances for operational reasons, not for deontic ones.   
We denote with [+] the operations for which the role is qualified.  We can also de-
fine a subsumption relation between operations: by declaring op1⊃op2 we mean that 
op1 can only be executed as part of op2, in which case a component qualified to do 
op2 is also qualified to do op1. 
The general structure of a social role is as follows: 
 social role rolename {specialises rolename} 
 types {{par}+:datatype}* 
 operations { 
  {'[+]'} opname {⊃ opname} 
 }* 
For instance, GPs (General Practitioners) are qualified to perform routine tasks of 
seeing patients and registering for shifts in wards.  A GP can also perform minor 
operations but will trigger a role violation unless he/she is an instance of a role that is 
qualified to do so. 
We introduce the notion of task as an unordered set of events involved in the same 
activity.  Among them, one or two events, corresponding to entry and exit operations, 
are considered as Behavioural Implicit Communications that need to be managed by 
the normative reconfiguration view (as captured by social laws) instead of causal 
coordination context. Our roles and coordination interfaces fit well together in the 
sense that they capture complementary aspects of human components: organisational 
and capability-related. 
The overall importance of distinguishing between ability and qualification to per-
form an operation is that it reduces what are normally called normative positions [22] 
to deontically-governed role transitions.  This is because, in the context of an archi-
tectural approach to system development, it is easy to model role transition in terms 
of dynamic reconfiguration.  In the absence of such an explicit hierarchy, sub-ideal 
situations would have to be resolved just by means of sanctions.  Instead, we take a 
more positive and active approach by enabling a reconfiguration if the current context 
allows such a deviation of the norm to be tolerated.  This is precisely the goal of so-
cial laws as discussed below. 
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Figure 2: A role hierarchy 
2.2.2   Social Laws 
A social law is an architectural primitive through which a software architect models 
the circumstances in which a system is considered to be in a sub-ideal situation and 
how the system should respond to such a situation so as to preserve the overall integ-
rity of the system.  A sub-ideal situation occurs either as a result of a human deviating 
from a prescribed routine or by detecting a trigger that refers to a predetermined con-
textual change in the environment.  A human may deviate from his prescribed behav-
iour either by acquiring a non-granted permission or by not obeying an imposed obli-
gation that urges him/her to execute an action provided that appropriate architectural 
facilities are granted. 
A social law captures interactions of a partner declared as an anchor role.  Besides 
the anchor role, a social law identifies other partners through either social roles or 
coordination interfaces. The former are useful for reconfiguration operations and the 
latter for both detecting triggers and reconfigurations as explained below. 
 social law name 
 anchor role social role 
 partners {social role, coordination interface}* 
 types {{par}+:datatype}* 
 {violation rule 
  when trigger 
   if condition 
   reconfiguration task 
   sanction {operation}* 
 }* 
In addition, a social law comprises one or more violation rules.  We distinguish 
three kinds of triggers for violation rules: (1) operations of the anchor role that are 
executed by social components that have no qualification; (2) operations for which 
the anchor role is qualified but they are initiated in a context in which they are not 
permitted; (3) operations of the anchor role that are not executed in contexts in which 
they are required.  
The first takes the form: 
 unqualified operation 
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The second takes the form: 
 operation and not enabling state 
The third are of the form: 
 active state and not operation 
Notice that, in order to detect the violation of the enabling state (permission), we 
need a coordination interface that provides an operation that returns a Boolean value 
and, in order to detect the violation of the obligation, we need a coordination interface 
that provides an event.  The “negated operation” holds in the states in which the op-
eration has not been scheduled for execution by the component that instantiates the 
anchor role.  
2.2.3   A Motivating Example 
This example was extracted from a survey undertaken at a Gastroenterology depart-
ment1 in UAE.  By looking into their documentation we elicited a group of norms 
that affect the behaviour of doctors:  (1) No operation can be undertaken without the 
patient’s permission; (2) Surgical intervention should be carried by Surgeons2 only; 
(3) In the case of emergency, a doctor may commit simple surgical interventions if 
surgeons are not available and it is a life-saving context.   
As an example, consider the social law that applies to minor operations.  Such pro-
cedures involve a social role – a GP – who is the anchor role in the sense that the 
social laws will apply to the actions performed by instances of this role, e.g. a gastro-
enterologist.  In addition, three coordination interfaces are required to ensure that the 
GP interacts with the right components: the device that is monitoring the procedure – 
monitor-procedure, and the software component that provides access to administra-
tive data – administrator.  In the configuration of the system, there will be coordina-
tion laws modelling the way these components interact.  Because of lack of space, we 
are not able to provide the definition of the relevant coordination interfaces and laws. 
 social law minor-operation 
 anchor role d:GP 
 type p:patient, op:operation 
 partners a:administrator, m:monitor-procedure 
 violation rule 
  when d.minorOp(op,p) and not a.ensureConsent(op,d,p) 
   if m.alarm(p) 
   reconfiguration reconfMinor(d,op) 
   sanction a.record(d,op,”no_consent”) 
  when unqualified d.minorOp(op,p) 
   if m.alarm(p) 
   reconfiguration reconfUnqual(d,op,p) 
   sanction a.record(d,op,”unqualified”) 
The social law has two rules triggered by the same event: the moment in which a 
doctor initiates the operation on the patient.  The first rule handles the situation in 
which there is no record of consent having been given by the patient for the doctor to 
perform that operation.  If the monitor detects that there is an emergency situation, 
                                                          
1  A specialized medical unit in Rashid Hospital, Dubai, U.A.E., that provides treatment for 
digestive diseases. The unit consists of an Endoscopies suite containing two modern fully 
equipped endoscopies rooms with ancillary supporting facilities for patient’s reception, 
preparation and post-endoscopies recovery rooms. 
2 A reader should refer to Figure 2 for roles, tasks and permissions definitions. 
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then a reconfiguration of the context is performed to put in place the components and 
coordination contracts that are required for the operation to proceed.  This may in-
volve, for instance, providing access to further information registered on the patient’s 
file, say on allergies.  However, if the monitor does not detect an emergency, sanc-
tions apply by recording the violation in the doctor’s file. 
The second rule is activated if the actual doctor is not qualified to perform minor 
operations, which is possible because the doctor’s role matches one of the roles in the 
non-surgical branch of the doctor’s role hierarchy: GP, registrar internal or gastro.  In 
this case, we have to distinguish again if there is an emergency.  For simplicity, we 
used the same alarm condition provided by the monitor.  If an emergency is indeed 
detected, a reconfiguration of the context is performed to allow the doctor to proceed, 
for instance unblocking actions that, in normative states, should be forbidden to the 
doctor.  Otherwise, sanctions apply.  Notice that the reconfiguration operation takes 
the doctor as a parameter: the hospital may have different rules about the context that 
should be present during an operation depending on the type of doctor. 
Notice that both rules can apply – the doctor may not be qualified and the patient 
may not have given consent.  In the case of an emergency, both reconfigurations 
apply; otherwise, both sanctions are implemented. The subsequent section highlights 
reconfiguration operations and the formalism used to reason about them. 
3 Modeling Reconfiguration Operations 
In order to reason about system reconfigurations at a higher level of abstraction we 
require a representation of the system’s configuration, its graph of components and 
connections at runtime, as well as of the rules governing their evolution. Graphs and 
graph transformation [15] provide a visually compelling yet mathematically rigorous 
formal technique that addresses our needs.  
3.1    Modeling Configuration Graphs 
Configuration graphs consist of nodes that refer to the system’s social, mechanical 
and technological entities, and edges representing connectors that are superimposed 
on these entities to coordinate their interactions.  More precisely, a configuration 
graph is a labelled graph where nodes are components labelled with instantiated inter-
faces and edges are connectors (contracts) labelled with the corresponding law type.  
Valid system configurations (instances) are such that their graphs conform to con-
straints defined by type graphs – “filters” that restrict the allowed types of the instan-
tiated nodes as well as types and cardinality of edges that connect them to populate an 
architecture instance.  
We developed a specific graph typing structure to distinguish between configura-
tion entities (nodes) whose corresponding permissions are fixed and some other enti-
ties that hold permissions amenable to change at runtime, e.g. social entities.  This 
typing structure yields a twofold representation of the configuration graph that com-
prises a components configuration graph [20] and a role configuration graph that 
captures instances of roles, tasks and entry actions of social entities.  More con-
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cretely, the components graph is sufficient to reflect casual properties of software, 
mechanical components and their connections but it falls short of providing a suitable 
representation of human components that are biddable and subject to organisational 
norms that can be violated.  Conversely, the role graph includes a biddable dimension 
and an organisational dimension; the former addresses the biddable nature of human 
components, which requires non-causal modelling primitives; the latter is constructed 
for modelling human capabilities and permissions within an organisation. The bridge 
between the two-configuration graphs consists of the common human nodes and the 
edge between the targeted task and its associated coordination interface copy that 
defines the signature of operations and services included in this task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The configuration Graph 
Figure 3 depicts a Configuration graph as a snapshot of the system configuration 
that preserves the constraints of the type graph: a biddable entity (John) calling an 
entry operation that is beyond his role’s permissions. 
3.2    Modeling Reconfiguration Rules Using Graph Transformations 
Formally, a typed attributed graph transformation rule r: LÆR consists of a pair of 
instance configuration graphs that conform to a type graph TG, and whose intersec-
tion is well-defined (this implies that edges that appear in both L and R are connected 
to the same vertices in both graphs, that vertices with the same name have to have the 
same type, and so on).  The left-hand side L represents the pre-conditions of the rule 
while the right-hand side R describes the post-conditions.   The AGG3 tool has been 
used to demonstrate configurations and reconfigurations as graphs and transformation 
rules.  
                                                          
3 The Attributed Graph Grammar System:  http://tfs.cs.tu-berlin.de/agg/ 
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We devised two types of reconfigurations: local reconfigurations operations that 
target human (biddable) components by writing his/her permissions or obligations; 
global reconfigurations make a full transition to a new workflow entry (an initial 
task).  For example, reconfUnqual(role/subject, operation, target)  performs  a recon-
figuration operation on a human role/task space and its bound permissions, whereas 
reconfGloabl(role, Process, entry_operation)  manipulate both software and hard-
ware entities configuration to allow the human participant to perform a new set of 
operations to achieve new goals as a response of new context settings.  
Both reconfiguration operations provide operational semantics for social laws by 
allowing humans, participating in an instance configuration, to deviate from the pre-
scribed process pattern, e.g. medical pathways, at the execution time and/or perform-
ing a global reconfiguration: simply model the transition from the current configura-
tion (process) to another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: ReconfUnequal Transformation rule 
 
For simplicity and due to space limitations we provide a simple transformation rule 
(Figure 4) that illustrates a generic and role-based reconfiguration operation – recon-
fUnqual – in which a GP  is allowed to perform a minor surgery – tracheostomy – in 
case of emergency, provided that the preconditions are tested by the corresponding 
social law body when the entry operation is fired.  Labels <<destroyed>> and 
<<new>> in Figure 3 designate deleted and created nodes/edges imposed by the cor-
responding transformation rule.                                                                                                                                         
The formalisation provided through graph transformations supports reasoning 
about reconfiguration steps,  brings together computation and coordination with proc-
ess management in a single model and facilitates the derivation of overall system 
behaviour by exploiting the notion on operational semantics c.f. GOS [9]. 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
The main contribution of our research has been to leverage modelling primitives 
developed for software architectures to cater for interactions that involve human 
components.  Our approach takes into account the biddable, non-causal nature of 
human actions, and provides a mechanism for adjusting permissions and obligations 
on interactions between technical and human components so as to react and adapt to 
changes in the environment in which they operate.  Similarly, adaptation may result 
from monitoring services [4] and imply a reconfiguration of roles and interactions.  
Our approach follows a normative system perspective and includes: social laws that 
express reactions to non-normative situations that may arise from violation of permis-
sions or obligations; social roles that capture humans capabilities within organisa-
tions; operations that, within social laws, can reconfigure interactions and/or reassign 
roles to human components. 
 In the future, we would like to explore the synergies between our architectural ap-
proach and recent research on workflow-based systems, which have been shifting 
from Workflow Control Patterns and Workflow Data Patterns to that Workflow Re-
source Pattern [20].  The latter come in line with our focus on modelling resources 
(human/non human) and their interactions.  Recent research on workflow has also 
shed light on the need for runtime changes – momentary changes in [23].  Addition-
ally, Lenz et al. [17] stated that there is a price to be paid for isolating control flow 
from application logic.  They put forward a workflow engine to accommodate ad-hoc 
changes at different levels of abstractions.  Although they distinguish between stable 
organizational processes and continuously changing clinical treatment processes, they 
are not able to model how knowledge about medical staff may affect such changes.  
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Abstract. Current challenges in Healthcare Information Systems (HIS) include
supplying patients with personalized medical information, creating means for ef-
ficient information flow between different healthcare providers in order to lower
risks of medical errors and increase the quality of care. To address these chal-
lenges, the information about patient-related processes, such as currently exe-
cuted medical protocols, should be made available for medical staff and patients.
Existing HIS are mostly data-centered, and therefore cannot provide an adequate
solution. To give processes a prominent role in HIS, we apply the adaptive work-
flow nets framework. This framework allows both healthcare providers and pa-
tients to get an insight into the past and current processes, but also foresee possi-
ble future developments. It also ensures quality and timing of data communication
essential for efficient information flow.
Keywords: adaptive workflows, EPR, medical protocols, Healthcare Information
Systems.
1 Introduction
The recent study of the Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate [23] has established a
number of serious shortcomings in the communication between healthcare providers
that can cause risks for patient safety. The typical examples named in the study are a
lack of communication between the anesthesiologist and the surgeon involved in the
same surgery; repetitive overwritings of variable data, such as blood pressure, with no
information when, in which circumstances and by whom the measurements were per-
formed; the use of “no message — good message” principle in the communication be-
tween specialists; providing insufficient information for patients about their treatments
and expected developments. Another tendency reported is the steady increase of the to-
tal amount of patient-related information available, which, on one hand, increases the
survival rate, but on the other hand, complicates the overall picture due to the chaotic
nature of the information. The chance that the surgeon is aware of all information rele-
vant to the surgery being performed is estimated as very low. The problems mentioned
indicate a great need in a new generation of Health Information Systems (HIS) that
would satisfy new information and communication demands.
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At the same time, the patient should become a focal point of the new generation
HIS. On April 30 of 2004, the European Commission adopted an action plan [7] aiming
at making healthcare better for European citizens. As opposed to currently available
provider-centered health systems, the action plan envisions citizen-centered health sys-
tems. A survey of Harris Interactive and ARiA Marketing conducted in 2000 [15] shows
that more than 80% of the respondents are interested in obtaining on-line personalized
medical information and electronic alerts specific to their medical histories, while 69%
would like to have access to the charts that monitor the progress. Therefore, in this pa-
per we aim at the creating a new concept of HIS that would increase the availability of
personalized information in HIS both for care providers and for patients.
Currently employed HIS concentrate often on patient-related data rather than con-
sider treatments as processes producing these data. By getting access to the process
information, a patient can obtain a clear personalized picture of ongoing treatments,
expectations and risks. Therefore, (s)he is more likely to become an informed decision-
maker [8]—note that “participatory” decision-making model is recommended as the
preferred model of treatment decision-making [4]. Moreover, shifting the focus of health-
care information systems from data to processes provides a practitioner with informa-
tion on continuation of a treatment initiated by her and continued elsewhere. That is
another reason why we advocate the move from data to processes.
To address the issues raised above, we propose a new approach to HIS. The key
idea consists in associating a (number of) process(es) to each patient. By logging into
the private web area, the patient gets access to the information related to processes asso-
ciated to her. This information should include (a view on) data produced by previously
performed treatments and a number of likely scenarios for the treatment continuation.
Using the same information, a care provider can decide to alter an ongoing process, to
abort such a process or to initiate a new one. New processes can either be suggested
by a physician, or, more probably, they can be borrowed from a library of protocols,
including e.g., hospital policies and medical guidelines.
Our approach relies on the framework of adaptive workflow nets [10, 12]. Main ad-
vantages of the framework include adaptivity, adaptability and separation of concerns.
By adaptivity we understand the ability of a process to modify itself as opposed to
adaptability, which is the ability of a process to be modified by an external party. By
separation of concerns we understand that every (sub)process has its owner, and the
owner is the only actor responsible for performing the steps of the process. Still, the
processes are interrelated and communicating.
In addition, we extend the currently used concept of the electronic patient record
(EPR) with the notion of history. In other words, rather than overwriting the blood pres-
sure in a database cell, we record the measurement every time it has been taken, by
whom (the owner of the process), when and why (note that this information can be
automatically generated since we know to which process this action belongs). This his-
tory is then used in the decision making process. It should be noted that the availability
of history also enables the application of data and process mining techniques [2, 17],
which can lead to improving the quality of medical care.
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2 Motivating example
As a motivating example we consider the story of Saskia, a thirty-six years old Dutch
preschool teacher, pregnant with her first child in the fifth week gestation. Saskia occa-
sionally uses her home computer for chatting with her friends or looking up information
on the Internet. During her pregnancy Saskia is assisted by a number of healthcare pro-
fessionals: midwives, lab assistants, doctors, having (partial) access to Saskia’s (elec-
tronic) patient record. Below we present the first steps of Saskia’s pregnancy in the
current situation and discuss possible improvements due to the implementation of our
approach.
Currently Saskia looks up the information on midwifes’ offices in an on-line tele-
phone directory. After consulting the web-sites of the offices, she selects one, and calls
the office to arrange an appointment with a midwife. During the first visit, the mid-
wife records Saskia’s medical, social and gynaecological history and orders a number
of standard lab tests: blood type, rhesus, iron deficiency, glucose level and urine. More-
over, since Saskia is thirty-six years old, the midwife briefly informs her on possible
age-related risks for the baby and additional tests that can be performed. Upon receiv-
ing this information Saskia gets overanxious: she has no time to reflect on the matter
and she is not able to decide whether she is willing to take these tests.
Getting home Saskia talks to her husband and looks for additional information avail-
able on-line. Based on this information she decides to undergo a nuchal translucency
scan (NT screening). Saskia calls the midwifes’ office to arrange another appointment
at which she would order the test.
Blood tests show that Saskia is Rh(D) negative, while her husband is Rh(D) positive.
Therefore, at twenty eight weeks gestation she gets an anti Rh(D) IgG immunoglobulin
injection, which will be repeated after the delivery.
Desired After selecting the office, Saskia fills an on-line form with her personal data.
Being prompted what means of communication (e-mail, text messages, regular mail,
phone call) does she prefer, Saskia chooses text messages. Indeed, Saskia is very excited
about her pregnancy and wants to get all the information as soon as possible whether
she is at home, at her office or out with friends. However, she is a working woman and
not every moment might be appropriate for getting the information. Figure 1 presents
the completed registration form.
Saskia receives a text message informing her which standard tests she should un-
dergo. She also gets a link to a personalized web-page providing her with information
on age-related risks and additional tests. Saskia takes her time to study the web-page
together with her husband and decides to undergo an NT screening. She indicates this
choice on her personalized web-page. A number of test times is proposed to her taking
into account the scanner availability and that NT screening is performed between the
eleventh and the fourteenth weeks gestation. The time selected and additional informa-
tion are sent to the laboratory working with the midwifes’ office.
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Fig. 1. Registration on-line form
Moreover, Saskia gets informed on possible future developments. For instance, she
learns that if, according to the NT screening results, a chance of her baby being affected
is high, she will be offered to undergo amniocentesis to obtain a conclusive evidence.
The personalized web-page further includes a personalized pregnancy calender. All
appointments arranged are automatically added and reminders are sent. Furthermore,
depending on Saskia’s personal data and outcomes of the preceding tests, new appoint-
ments to be scheduled are highlighted in the corresponding periods. For instance, anti
Rh(D) IgG immunoglobulin injections will appear on the twenty eighth week and in her
delivery procedure description. Note that healthcare providers have access to Saskia’s
pregnancy calender and get alerted, for example, if she fails to show up at her anti Rh(D)
IgG immunoglobulin injection date.
Requirements imposed by the example In order to support the desired scenario pre-
sented above a number of changes has to be introduced to current healthcare informa-
tion systems. First of all, in order to provide Saskia with information on possible future
developments, a healthcare information system should be made aware of the ongoing
processes rather than only data involved. Recall that data relates to information till the
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Fig. 2. Genetic condition related tests
current moment, while patients can be eager to know what can happen next. However,
assuming one ongoing process is not realistic, as different healthcare providers have
their own rules and processes. Sharing these processes might be superficial (a midwife
should not necessarily be knowledgeable of the biochemistry of a blood test) or undesir-
able (lab assistant should not have access to Saskia’s personal information). Therefore,
rather than considering one process we envision a series of interrelated but independent
processes.
Another important conclusion that we can draw from our example is that processes
should be able to modify themselves on-the-fly. For instance, when Saskia’s Rh(D) turns
out to be negative, special treatment should be performed, i.e., a special process should
be initiated in parallel with the ongoing one. We refer to the ability of a process to
modify itself on-the-fly as adaptivity. Still, we do not intend to substitute medical stuff
by an automatic decision making system. The choice of treatment protocols is certainly
made by the care providers together with the patient. Therefore, processes should be
not only adaptive but also adaptable.
3 Adaptive Petri Nets
As we could see in the Saskia example, HIS is a domain with a great need for adaptivity.
In this section we present the theoretical foundations of our approach, so called adaptive
Petri nets, and we illustrate the concepts introduced by means of a running example:
a simplified version of the Dutch age-related prenatal diagnostics protocol, given in
Figure 2. The owner of the considered process is the midwife.
A Petri net [18] is a bipartite graph whose nodes are called places and transitions.
Transitions, graphically represented as rectangles, correspond to actions being taken.
5th International Conference on BPM 2007 Workshop: BPM in Healthcare
Page 45
Places are represented as circles, and they are used to define the process flow. Given a
transition we distinguish the input places of the transition, i.e., places with an arc going
to the transition, and output places of the transition, i.e., places with an incoming arc
coming from the transition. The Petri net presented in Figure 2 includes such transitions
as “select age-related diagnostics, first trimester” and “communicate negative news and
select further diagnostics”. The name of a transition is written under the corresponding
rectangle.
Workflow nets [1] are a special class of Petri nets, well-suited for modelling work-
flow processes. Workflow nets have exactly one place with no incoming arcs, called the
initial place, and exactly one place with no outgoing arcs, called the final place. More-
over, every node in a workflow net is on a path from the initial place to the final place.
Extended workflow nets [10] can be obtained from a workflow net by adding exception
transitions, which are transitions with at least one input place and no output places. Ex-
ception transitions are used for modelling undesirable, abnormal or irregular events of
such a nature that the process cannot decide itself how to continue and an assistance of a
higher authority/layer is required. The Petri net in Figure 2 is an extended workflow net
with the initial place i, the final place f and the exception transition “genetic condition
established”.
The state of a system is represented by means of tokens, drawn as black dots and re-
siding in places. The initial state consists of a single token in the initial place i, while the
final state consists of a single token in the final place f . The final state corresponds to the
most likely, expected, termination of the process. Dynamics of a process is expressed
by means of the token game: performing an action corresponds to a transition firing re-
moving a token from every input place and adding a token to every output place of the
transition. For instance, “select age-related diagnostics, first trimester” removes one to-
ken from the initial place i and produces one token in the output place light diagnostics
ongoing. Figure 2 shows the state of the system before a firing of “select age-related
diagnostics, first trimester”. In the normal course of events, process terminates when we
reach the state consisting of a single token on place f . Firings of exception transitions
terminate the execution of the process independently of the process state, disregarding
the fact whether there are still tokens left and transitions enabled.
Colored Petri nets [16] extend Petri nets by introducing data and time into the
model, i.e., allowing to model a data flow in addition to a control flow. Due to his-
torical reasons data types are commonly referred to as colors. Classical Petri nets are
extended there by guards and arc inscriptions. The guard is a logical expression deter-
mining whether the transition may fire. Arc expressions at the outgoing arcs define data
transformations. The firing of transitions become thus data dependent, and, moreover,
transitions modify data.
Global history nets [12] further extend Petri nets by assuming the availability of a
history record, registering all firings and the time of firing together with the information
which process performed it. Transition guards can depend on the information contained
in the history record. Guards are written between square brackets. For instance, “select
age-related diagnostics, first trimester” has the following guard: “clk ≤ 14 and (age >
35 or #miscarriage> 2)”. This means that the corresponding EPR contains information
that the gestation week is not later than 14 (clk denotes here the pregnancy clock), and
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either the maternal age exceeds 35 or the history record contains at least three previous
miscarriages.
Adaptive nets[10] further extend the formalism by introducing a special color: nets.
In other words, a token can be associated with another (adaptive) net, called a token
net. Token nets are created by using suggested library nets or tailor-made nets. So, the
firing of “select age-related diagnostics, first trimester” is in fact a procedure where
the midwife together with the pregnant woman decides which prenatal test procedure
will be carried out, if any at all. The suggested tests (NT scan, AFP, CVS and none)
are indicated on the outgoing arc of the transition. By using “any” in the suggested
set of token nets, we allow to take an arbitrary, possibly tailor-made, protocol. The
considered example does not make use of these freedom of choice, since the set of
tests is predefined. Note that the owner of the created token net is not necessarily the
midwife. In this example, it will be a lab performing the selected test procedure.
Guards can be used to synchronize firings of the (upper layer) net with firings of a
token net. The transition “communicate negative news and select further diagnostics”
fires if the selected test procedure reports a high risk of genetic condition (NOK), for it is
conditioned by the guard NOK(x), where x refers to the token consumed from the “light
diagnostics ongoing” place. In other words, NOK in the selected test procedure and
“communicate negative news and select further diagnostics” fire synchronously, which
corresponds to the communication between the lab and the midwife. An additional form
of synchronization is illustrated by “further diagnostics not needed”. This transition can
fire if the token net in the “light diagnostics ongoing” place has reached its final state,
i.e., the only token present in the token net is residing in its final place.
4 Modelling Care Processes with Adaptive Nets
In this section we discuss how adaptive nets, discribed in Section 3 can be used to
model care processes discussed in Section 2. First of all, we assume that (a view on) the
electronic patient record (EPR) is available for all nets. EPR can be seen as a standard
data record extended with the history log. Access to the EPR can and typically is further
restricted depending on the task being performed: all tasks should be able to consult the
pregnancy clock, but it is set during the registration and can be corrected by the midwife
only.
Although the theoretical framework of adaptive nets does not restrict in the depth
of nesting, we envision that the care applications will typically make use of three-
layered processes. The top-level process represents the main process flow: registration,
the choice of diagnostics and treatment protocols and closing the case. The main pro-
cess flow can be associated with strategic goals. The second layer is normally a protocol
layer. Processes of the second layer can can be carried out by the main care provider
herself or delegated to other care providers. The operations can be seen as implement-
ing the tactic goals of the process. The net at Figure 2 provides an example of a second
level net. Finally, realization of medical protocols can require services of parties such
as medical labs. These basic steps constitute the third and the last level of the process.
The deviations from the described process architecture scheme are of course possi-
ble: the midwife could for example demand Saskia to consult a cardiologist in case her
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Fig. 3. Generic schema of a subprocess.
blood pressure is repeatedly evaluated as too high. The cardiologist process, located at
the second layer in this case, is however a strategic-level process, which is still a service
for the midwife protocol. The nesting depth in this case could be greater than three.
The top-level process consists typically of the initialization (registration, analysis
of the history available), a number of subprocesses taking care of adaptivity aspects,
and a process termination (including a semi-automatic post-processing of the EPR to
provide consistent data for future use). Figure 3 shows a pattern for a subprocess. The
transition “initiate an additional protocol” is mostly often triggered by some event in
the environment (e.g. an additional complaint of a patient). In response to this event, an
additional protocol can be chosen and started (alternatively, or additionally, the token
net on the place “standard meta-protocol” can be modified). Exceptions and the termi-
nation of this additional protocol are then processed by the corresponding transitions
by initiating new processes of modifying the running protocol. Note that there are two
kinds of exception-guards possible — the first one are guards demanding a synchro-
nization with a corresponding exception transition in the token net, while the second
one are guards specifying some external trigger.
The history record is composed from all actions taken in each protocol and it pro-
vides not only the information on the action taken but also specifies who (which pro-
cess) took it. Also the initiations of additional protocols and modifications in the run-
ning protocols are logged. This allows to keep the (otherwise chaotic) history record
well-structured, since we can always make a query to get all the information related to
some treatment, abstract from unnecessary details (e.g. do not show actions of the third
layer protocols), aggregate information related to a class of treatments (e.g. cardiolog-
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Fig. 4. Saskia’s appointments calendar
ical treatments), even if these treatments were initiated by different care providers (the
midwife, the GP, the cardiologist).
Having the information on the processes running, we can construct a forecast view
for both care providers and the patient by constructing and exploring a (partial) state
space of the running protocols. Here different options are possible. The most simple
one is constructing a forecast under the assumption that no exception will happen (e.g.
the normal course of pregnancy, taking into account personal ERP information, like
negative Rh(D)). More elaborated views allows to look into the future taking into ac-
count exceptions that are predefined in the running protocols. For instance, when the
age-related diagnostics protocol in Fig. 2 is started for Saskia, it is possible to build a
view informing that amniocentesis can be performed in case the NT-screening reports
a high risk of a genetic condition.
The first type of a forecast view (the likely one) can also be used for such a prag-
matic thing as planning appointments, tests and treatments. An important issue here
is that the interprocess dependencies and restrictions can be handled, so that different
protocols would not interfere or damage each other. Another trivial gain is e.g. pro-
viding a personalized pregnancy calendar for Saskia (see Figure 4) and providing her
with reminders on appointments and tests supplied with additional information, like
prerequisites of these tests.
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5 Conclusion
The major contribution of our work consists in proposing a process-centered patient-
centered framework for the new generation of HIS. While patient-centered systems
attract more and more attention of the research community, the current proposals [5,
21] concentrate mostly on implementation issues, such as data communication and het-
erogeneity of the application platforms, rather than on the conceptual ones, such as
separation of concerns and adaptivity.
Our proposal is based on a solid theoretical foundation, namely, adaptive (nested)
nets [11, 10], a subclass of Petri nets. This allows us to perform a number of automatic
correctness checks, like soundness and circumspectness. Soundness means that every
process can terminate properly from any reachable state, while circumspectness means
that every exception can be taken care of by the higher layer.
We do not expect the end user to know what Petri nets are and aim at providing a
user-friendly web-interface instead. For this purpose, we developed the tool YasperWe
[9] that is designed for prototyping IS. The tool integrates Yasper, which is a Petri net
editor including a number of analysis options and compatible with some other analysis
tools, with Microsoft Infopath.
Related work Processes in healthcare are commonly documented in the form of med-
ical guidelines. A guideline is not limited to doctors but also covers the workspace of
nurses and paramedical personnel. There have been several attempts to formalize guide-
lines as flowcharts and decision diagrams and incorporate them into medical decision
support systems.
Petri nets have been used for modeling of healthcare workflow, also known as care-
flow [13, 19, 20]. The guideline execution system GUIDE [20] translates formalized
guidelines to a hierarchical timed colored Petri net. The resulting net can be run to sim-
ulate the implementation of the guideline in clinical setting. However, this formalism
misses adaptivity and separation of concerns. The idea of adaptivity, i.e., controlled
modification, in Petri nets has been considered in [6, 14]. However, these approaches
were able to model only processes involving two care providers, for instance, a midwife
and a general practitioner, which is not sufficient for common healthcare processes.
Currently, there are several approaches that offer some degree of flexibility. Many
share the idea of modeling with underspecification, i.e. a model where parts of the
process are not given explicitly, but represented by a placeholder. At run-time the con-
figuration is completed by binding the placeholder to a process from a repository, which
is also known as late binding. Adaptive nets [10, 11], worklets [3], pockets of flexibil-
ity [22] are modeling techniques that allow for late binding. Three main advantages of
adaptive nets compared to the other approaches are the following:
– the ability to modify the structure of running processes in a controlled fashion;
– the possibility to define explicit synchronization between a token net and its owner;
– verification of a number of correctness properties for a subclass of adaptive nets.
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Future work For the future work, we are going to propose a number of process pat-
terns to facilitate process modelling and a number of query patterns for the creation of
different user views.
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Abstract. There is currently a strong focus worldwide on the potential
of large-scale Electronic Health Record systems to cut costs and improve
patient outcomes through increased efficiency. A number of countries are
developing nationwide EHR systems to aggregate services currently pro-
vided by isolated Electronic Medical Record databases. However, such
aggregation introduces new risks for patient privacy and data security,
both by linking previously-separate pieces of information about an indi-
vidual, and by creating single access points to a wide range of personal
data. It is thus essential that new access control policies and mechanisms
are devised for federated Electronic Health Record systems, to ensure
not only that sensitive patient data is accessible by authorized personnel
only, but also that it is available when needed in life-critical situations.
Here we review the traditional security models for access control, Dis-
cretionary Access Control, Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based
Access Control, and use a case study to demonstrate that no single one
of them is sufficient in a federated healthcare environment. We then
show how the required level of data security can be achieved through a
judicious combination of all three mechanisms.
1 Introduction
The healthcare domain—as one of the world’s largest hybrid organizations—
stands to gain enormously from increased adoption of Information and Commu-
nications Technologies. Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems are the latest
evolution of healthcare ICT, and countries such as Australia, the United King-
dom and the USA are all working on plans for national EHR systems [9].
An Electronic Health Record is defined by Iakovidis [12] as “digitally stored
healthcare information about an individual’s lifetime with the purpose of sup-
porting continuity of care, education and research, and ensuring confidentiality
at all times”. It is a mechanism for integrating healthcare information currently
collected in both paper files and Electronic Medical Record (EMR) databases
by a variety of separate healthcare providers [16].
Electronic Health Records enable efficient communication of medical infor-
mation, and thus reduce costs and administrative overheads [5]. Furthermore,
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EHRs will help to reduce incidents of medication error—in current healthcare
systems, medical data is entered and can be interpreted in inconsistent and pos-
sibly ambiguous ways. Moreover, a patient’s health records are currently often
dispersed over multiple sites with no single healthcare professional having access
to all of this data. Nationwide EHR systems aim to solve these problems.
However, to achieve these potential benefits, the healthcare industry must
overcome several significant obstacles. Currently, medical information is stored
in a variety of proprietary formats using numerous off-the-shelf and custom-built
medical information systems. This results in a severe inter-operability problem
in the healthcare sector [4].
Also, the security of each patient’s medical data is a major issue [15] which, if
not addressed in both a technically-sufficient and transparent way, will lose the
patient’s confidence in and trust of the EHR system. In a worst-case scenario,
patients may resorting to falsifying information in an attempt to preserve their
privacy, thus affecting the integrity of the stored data and potentially leading
to life-threatening situations such as inappropriate medication. Chhanabhai et
al. [2] showed in their EHR usability survey that 73.3% of participants were
highly concerned about the security and privacy of their health records. Their
study indicated that consumers are ready to accept the transition to EHR sys-
tems, but only provided they can be assured of the system’s security.
Several solutions are available to overcome the security concerns associated
with EHR systems. Cryptographic technology, through the use of Public Key
Infrastructure [3], allows confidential information to be transmitted safely via
an insecure communications medium such as the Internet. On its own, however,
cryptography merely handles the security of data transmission and does not
address the issue of what kind of data is transmitted, or solve the problem of
who has access to the data at the sending and receiving ends.
To do this we need to consider access control mechanisms that limit who can
see Electronic Health Records and how they can manipulate them. Access control
mechanisms have been through many developments [14] in both academia and
industry in order to satisfy the needs of healthcare domains. However, progress
to date have not been sufficient to meet the security requirements of a federated
healthcare environment [8]. Most of the models developed so far have been de-
signed to satisfy healthcare security requirements in a controlled environment,
such as the Electronic Medical Record database maintained within a hospital.
By contrast, access control mechanisms for EHRs must be safe for use in open
networks, such as the Internet, and with peripheral equipment that was not
designed for highly-secure operations, such as a patient’s home computer.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) are well-established access control principles
and have been recognized as official standards. Each was designed to overcome
limitations found in its predecessor. DAC, the first standard introduced, con-
trols each user’s access to information on the basis of the user’s identity and
authorization [17]. MAC, the second standard introduced, governs access on the
basis of the security classification of subjects (users) and objects in the system.
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RBAC, the third standard introduced, regulates user access to information on
the basis of the activities particular types of users may execute in the system.
In this paper, we demonstrate through case studies that none of these three
mechanisms in isolation is sufficient for the privacy and security requirements of
Electronic Health Record systems. We then explain how a careful combination
of all three access control standards can be used to deliver the essential security
requirements of a federated EHR system.
2 Related and previous work
An access control mechanism is intended to limit the actions or operations that
a legitimate user of a computer system can perform [17]. This research area has
witnessed numerous developments in the last two decades that have resulted in
the widespread adoption of three different access control models. In this section
we introduce these three models and point out which of their known limitations
would apply in the healthcare domain.
2.1 Discretionary access control
Discretionary Access Control is a means of restricting access to objects based
on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong [7]. The controls
are discretionary in the sense that a user or subject given discretionary access
to a resource is capable of passing that capability along to another subject. The
identity of the users and objects is the key to discretionary access control. DAC
policies tend to be very flexible and are widely used. However, DAC policies are
known to be inherently weak for two reasons: granting read access is transitive
and DAC policies are vulnerable to “Trojan horse” attacks [10, 7].
DAC policies are commonly implemented through Access Control Lists
(ACLs) and ‘owner/other’ access control mechanisms, but these mechanisms
are difficult to manage because addition and deletion of users or data objects
requires discovery and treatment of all dependent entries in the DAC matrix.
In an Electronic Health Record system the access control requirements are
more complex than allowed for by Discretionary Access Control because the
data in an EHR is nominally ‘owned’ by the patient [9], but is also updated
by healthcare professionals, and is stored on infrastructure belonging to health-
care providers and regulators. Indeed, a DAC model could create new security
problems due to the patient’s mismanagement of their own records [7].
2.2 Mandatory access control
A Mandatory Access Control policy, which is known to prevent the “Trojan
horse” problem [7, 17], means that access control decisions are made by a central
authority, not by the individual owner of an object, and the owner cannot change
access rights. The need for a MAC mechanism arises when the security policy of
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a system dictates that protection decisions must not be decided by the object’s
owner, and the system must enforce data protection decisions [7].
Mandatory Access Control typically occurs in military-style security. Usu-
ally a security labeling mechanism and a set of interfaces are used to determine
access based on the MAC policy. For example, a user who is running a process
at the Secret classification level should not be allowed to read a file with a label
of Top Secret. This is known as the “simple security rule”, or “no read up”. By
contrast, a user who is running a process with a label of Secret should not be al-
lowed to write to a document with a label of Confidential. This rule is called the
“?-property” or “no write down”. Multilevel security models such as the Bell-La
Padula Confidentiality [6] and Biba Integrity [1] models are used to formally
specify this kind of MAC policy. Nevertheless, unintended information transfer
can occur in systems using MAC through covert channels, whereby informa-
tion of a higher security class is deduced indirectly by intelligently combining
information visible to a lower security class [10].
Applying Mandatory Access Control mechanisms in an EHR environment
is likely to be very difficult due to the huge number of users who participate
in those systems, the wide range of data types, and the desire to give patients
ownership and (partial) control over their own medical records. Nevertheless,
implementing some form of MAC policy is inevitable in an EHR system, since
medical authorities must be ultimately responsible for assigning access rights [5].
2.3 Role-based access control
Role-Based Access Control decisions are based on the roles that individual users
have as part of an organization. Users take on assigned roles (e.g. doctor, nurse
or receptionist in our case). Access rights (or permissions) are then grouped by
role name, and the use of resources is restricted to authorized individuals [10].
Under RBAC, users are granted membership into roles based on their compe-
tencies, credentials and responsibilities in the organization. User membership in
roles can be revoked easily and new operations established as job assignments
dictate. This simplifies the administration and management of permissions since
roles can be updated without updating the permissions for every individual user.
Moreover, use of role hierarchies provides additional advantages since one role
may implicitly include the operations associated with another role. Also, RBAC
can satisfy the “least privilege access” requirement [17], which involves granting
the minimum set of privileges required for individuals to perform their job func-
tions. Separation of Duty (SoD) can be incorporated into the RBAC model [18]
to ensure that a user is not allowed to execute two roles simultaneously, as per
the organization’s policy.
Role-Based Access Control has gained a lot of attention in healthcare security
research thanks to: its ability to provide practical fine-grained access policy
administration for a large number of users and resources; it being a neutral
policy; and its support for the ‘need-to-know’ security principle.
However, some access request evaluations are complex, due to the need to
consider other contextual parameters in the evaluation phase. To overcome this
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problem, the Contextual RBAC model adds contextual parameters (e.g. time
and location) to the RBAC model [19]. Nevertheless, even Contextual RBAC
is insufficient to support the dynamic permission assignments that are needed
in the healthcare domain, so Motta et al. [13] extended the model further so
that permission assignment is based on specific evaluation mechanisms using
contextual attributes that are available at access time, and Wilikens et al. [19]
used a trust level as a measurement to assign permissions.
Unfortunately, this extended process would add yet more complexity to an
EHR system — which requires establishing a connection between the EHR sys-
tem and the Hospital Information Systems (HISs) that are responsible for han-
dling administrative work within a hospital — in order to collect those contextual
attributes which are not immediately visible, for example, the requestor’s current
medical role (e.g. as a doctor in an emergency department).
3 Healthcare access control requirements
In the previous section we reviewed the capabilities of Discretionary Access Con-
trol, Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Access Control. In order to bet-
ter understand what kind of access control solution is needed for an Electronic
Health Record system, we summarize in this section the specific access control
requirements peculiar to EHR systems, illustrated by a small case study, and
review the weaknesses of the existing mechanisms in this situation.
A control mechanism for Electronic Health Record access must satisfy all
EHR participants’ needs, i.e. patients, medical practitioners and medical au-
thorities. Each participant needs to access certain fields of the health record
in order to carry out his job. Also, the various participants need the ability to
set specific access controls over the record. The following privacy and security
requirements have been identified as crucial to healthcare environments:
1. Each healthcare unit should have the freedom to design its own security
policy and to enforce it within its domain [15].
2. Healthcare providers (e.g. General Practitioners) should have the flexibility
to arbitrarily define the security of a particular document if so required.
3. Patients should have the right to have control over their own health records,
including whether or not to grant access to certain medical practitioners [15].
4. Patients should be able to hide specific items of information contained in
their health records from selected medical practitioners.
5. Patients should have the ability to delegate control over their health records
to someone else under certain conditions (e.g. mental illness).
6. Managing access control policies should be an easy task, in order to ensure
that the system is used and to preserve trust in the system.
7. It is important that legitimate uses of health records are not hindered, e.g.
overall system availability service levels, and overriding ‘need-to-know’ data
access requirements in emergencies.
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Ensuring each patient’s privacy and data security is vital for an Electronic
Health Record system. Unlike paper-based models, where an exposure or intru-
sion is confined to a single document or file, a federated EHR system creates
the possibility of a patient’s entire medical history being compromised by a sin-
gle action. However, each of the traditional access control models, reviewed in
Section 2, can satisfy only some of the above-listed requirements.
To see the access control weaknesses inherent in these previous models, con-
sider the following scenario:
Frank prefers to go to two General Practitioners, Tony and Karen. Frank
has two sensitive fields in his Electronic Health Record, describing mental
illness and sexual issues, respectively. Frank is happy to let Tony have
access to his EHR, including the relevant data field within his sexual
record, but he wants to hide a data field within his mental illness record
from Tony. On the other hand, Frank will allow Karen to access his EHR,
including his entire mental illness record, but not the sensitive data field
within his sexual record. Apart from these two GPs, Frank won’t allow
anyone to access the sensitive data fields in his mental or sexual health
records. In addition, Frank’s father John suffers from Alzheimer’s disease,
so Frank must manage the access control rights to his father’s EHR.
Even this simple and unremarkable scenario creates problems for each of the
traditional access control policies, as explained below.
Discretionary Access Control: To use a DAC model we first need to
know who owns the Electronic Health Record because DAC assumes that the
owner of the data is the one who controls access to it. However, in healthcare an
EHR is partially owned by each of the patient, medical practitioner and medical
authority [11], immediately creating an issue with respect to ownership. Further-
more, assuming that Frank has ownership of his EHR, he could nominate and
grant access to his trusted/preferred medical practitioners (Tony and Karen),
but it would be a difficult task for Frank as a non-expert to identify the specific
medical data that is needed by each GP to do their job. The ‘need-to-know’
principle is required here, and in order to have it Frank is required to know
the information that is needed for each medical practitioner and then set the
access controls accordingly. By granting patients such control over their records,
we may hinder the legitimate use of the EHR and, most likely, create another
security problem due to the patient’s mismanagement of their records. However,
delegation of access control can be implemented easily in a DAC model. Since
Frank’s father owns his EHR, he can delegate access control to his son.
Mandatory Access Control: In a MAC model, Frank won’t have any sort
of control, because the Electronic Health Record system will be responsible for
setting the security labels for users and EHR data objects. Therefore, Frank can’t
express his access control wishes over his EHR. Also, the ‘need-to-know’ principle
can’t be fully achieved here either, even if we apply a security level hierarchy.
It’s possible that two users might have the same security clearance (e.g. Tony
and Karen), but should have different access permissions over a certain data
object (e.g. mental health data). In the MAC case, we can’t assign more than
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one security label for the same data object, so providing selective access to data
objects is difficult. Moreover, there is no ability to delegate access control because
patients have no control over their EHRs.
Role-Based Access Control: In an RBAC model, the ‘need-to-know’ prin-
ciple can be satisfied by defining the permissions/operations that are required
by a specific medical role, and this process could be done by an appropriate
medical expert. However, in this situation Frank won’t be able to hide his sensi-
tive medical fields as he won’t have any control over the permission assignments.
In order to allow Frank to express his wishes, the information security officer
must allow Frank to modify the permissions, roles, user-role and role-permission
assignments. Frank would need to create three roles in order to satisfy his needs,
which would become an unacceptably time-consuming and complicated task for
most patients and is likely to lead to a conflict of access control settings. Dele-
gation of roles in RBAC is permitted if the security officer would allow Frank’s
father to delegate his roles to his son. Generally, RBAC seems a better choice
than DAC and MAC, though it is still not an adequate solution for EHR system
security.
In summary, it is clear than none of the existing models is adequate on its
own, but that each of them has some feature which is essential to an EHR security
model. DAC allows patients to control which data can be seen by particular
medical practitioners, MAC allows the medical authority to control access to
specific kinds of data, and RBAC allows access rights to be associated with
certain medical roles.
4 A combined access control protocol
Although the access control requirements for Electronic Health Records cannot
be satisfied by any one access control model alone, we contend that a careful
integration of all three existing models is sufficient. Combining existing models,
rather then developing an entirely new one for healthcare, allows us to take
advantage of the well-understood properties and established implementations
for these models.
4.1 Overview of the combined protocol
In the combined model access to a particular Electronic Health Record data
item is granted only if it satisfies all three policies. The challenge is to determine
where and how each of the access control constraints is introduced.
The basis for our combined protocol is shown in Fig. 1. An Electronic Health
Record schema is shown where each EHR field has two MAC-based security
labels: one is assigned by the patient and the second is assigned by the medical
practitioner. These labels are used to express the sensitivity class of the data
field. Also a DAC-style Access Control List (ACL) is maintained by the patient,
whereby the patient nominates his/her preferred/trusted medical practitioners
and sets the security clearance for each of them. This security clearance allows
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Fig. 1. The logical structure of the combined access control protocol
the medical practitioner to access sensitive data that may not be allowed for
other medical practitioners. Access to EHR fields is further restricted by overall
RBAC-based access control managed by the medical authority.
4.2 Maintenance and enforcement of access control constraints
Each of the participants in the EHR system (patients, medical practitioners
and medical authorities) needs to maintain some aspect of the combined access
control policy, and is constrained in what information they can view as a result.
In this section we describe the sequence of events needed to do this.
We start with the patients’ access control requirements, where the patients
want to decide who is authorized to access their Electronic Health Records, to
determine what is the sensitive information in their EHRs, and who is authorized
to access it. These requirements are satisfied by executing the following steps
using the DAC and MAC interfaces in our combined access control policy:
1. The patients nominate the names of specific practitioners who they trust,
and this is done through the DAC interface in Fig. 1 to construct the Access
Control List (ACL).
2. To categorize data fields as sensitive/protected information, the patient
needs to assign security labels to these data fields by using the MAC in-
terface to update the patient’s Electronic Health Record schema.
3. To allow specific medical practitioners to gain access to security-classified
data fields in the patient’s EHR, the patient, via the MAC interface, assigns
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the same security label of the sensitive data field to the authorized medical
practitioners’ ACL.
In practice, however, we do not suggest using the “no read up” and “no write
down” rules that are introduced in MAC because it would be too complex a task
for most patients to keep track of the transitive relationships introduced by a
full hierarchy of security levels. Instead patients should just be presented with
simple access/no-access settings.
Medical practitioners, as EHR consumers, have certain access control require-
ments that are important. Medical practitioners need to:
– access all the information that is required to fulfill their medical role in
normal scenarios (e.g. a standard consultation with a GP), unless the patient
has excluded that practitioner from accessing the particular data field;
– access all the information that is required in emergency cases regardless of
the patient’s access control settings; and
– hide some medical information from the patient.
Medical practitioners’ access control requirements are also satisfied here. The
following steps show how these requirements are met:
1. The Medical authority defines roles, permissions and role-permission assign-
ments via the RBAC interface. This process is done by domain experts who
know the access requirements for each medical role. Therefore, the ‘need-to-
know’ principle is achieved and medical practitioners’ access needs will not
be limited unless the patient has set some access control restriction through
either the DAC or MAC interface.
2. Since RBAC can incorporate contextual attributes into role assignments, it
would be possible for a medical practitioner to have an access role as a GP
in a day clinic or as a GP in an emergency department. To allow the GP
in an emergency department to access security-classified data records, the
RBAC policy would assign a security label to these critical roles to allow
them access to secure data. In an emergency case, the DAC constraints are
not evaluated, due to the fact that the patient won’t be able to know who
the attending medical practitioners will be in an emergency.
3. To hide some medical information from the patient, the medical practitioner,
through the use of the MAC interface, sets protection labels for these fields
which hide the existence of such data in the patient’s EHR.
Finally, the medical authority in charge of managing the Electronic Health
Record system acts as the ‘security officer’ in the RBAC interface. It defines roles
and permissions, and controls the assignment of permissions to roles in order to
associate specific medical roles with the information needed to fulfill them.
4.3 Motivational example revisited
In this section we revisit the motivational scenario from Section 3 to see how
our access control protocol would satisfy Frank’s wishes.
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Is the requested information needed by
Tony’s current medical role?
Tony Frank’s EHR Authorization System
DAC RBAC MAC
Access
Does Tony has the right security label(s)?
Is Tony authorized
Yes, authorized!
Yes!
Yes!
Evaluate access
context
Determine
role
Access request
Access
Information
Normal
access
context by Frank?
authorization?
is authorized
is disclosed
Fig. 2. The authorization evaluation process in the motivational example
1. Frank will classify the mental and sexual data fields of concern as ‘sensitive’
information by setting security labels S1 and S2 for each record, respectively.
2. He will nominate his preferred GPs Karen and Tony to access his EHR. As
Frank is happy to allow Karen to access his sensitive mental data field, he
will assign the S1 security label to her, which means that she is authorized
to access any sensitive information that has an S1 label, in addition to her
authorized access as per her medical role. For the same reason, Frank will
assign the S2 security label to Tony which will allow him to access the
sensitive sexual data field.
3. When Tony requests access to Frank’s Electronic Health Record, to see his
sexual history, the following access evaluation occurs (Fig. 2):
(a) Evaluate access context, ‘normal’ or ‘emergency’. If it’s an emergency go
to step 3c, otherwise continue.
(b) DAC policy: Does Frank authorize Tony to access his EHR?
(c) RBAC policy: Determine Tony’s current medical role (e.g. day clinic GP,
Emergency doctor) based on current contextual conditions.
(d) RBAC policy: Is the requested information needed by Tony’s current
medical role?
(e) MAC policy: Is Tony cleared to access this sensitive record?
(f) Tony is granted access to Frank’s sexual data only if his access request
passes all the steps above.
Also, as Frank needs to take responsibility for his father’s Electronic Health
Record, the following actions can be performed.
1. Frank’s father John needs to delegate control over his EHR to Frank through
the use of the DAC interface.
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2. Frank can now set the access rights to his father’s EHR.
As well as these static assignments, we also need to consider temporary
changes to access requirements. For instance, assume that Tony asks to see
Frank’s mental health record because he thinks that Frank’s sexual issue is af-
fected by some mental illness. This means that Frank must give Tony temporary
access to his sensitive mental data field.
1. Frank will grant Tony another security label, S1.
2. Tony now has two security labels S1 and S2 from Frank, which means that
he is authorized to access both of Frank’s sensitive data fields contained in
his sexual and mental health records.
3. After the consultation, Frank can revoke this permission by deleting label
S1 from Tony’s profile.
On the other hand, a medical practitioner may need to change the status of
certain fields without involving the patient. For instance, assume that Tony asks
Frank to take a blood test which turns out to be positive for HIV. Given Frank’s
mental state, Tony would prefer to hide the pathology results until Frank’s next
in-house consultation.
1. Tony assigns a ‘hide’ flag to the HIV lab result field in Frank’s EHR, so that
Frank can’t see any information contained in that specific field.
2. However, this information can be seen by Frank’s authorized medical prac-
titioners, such as the blood bank to which Frank regularly donates.
5 Conclusion and future work
Emerging plans for national Electronic Health Record systems raise new con-
cerns about patient privacy and data security, by merging medical records that
were previously kept separate and by making them accessible through single
access points. None of the three standard access control models, Discretionary
Access Control, Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Access Control, are
adequate for an EHR system in isolation. Nevertheless, we have explained how
a careful combination of all three access control models can provide the security
functionality needed for an EHR system.
At the time of writing we are assessing the security issues associated with
a prototype Service Oriented Architecture for healthcare data. Our goal is to
determine whether such an ‘application-oriented’ networking environment can
be used to implement the combined access control protocol described above.
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Abstract. Learning how to improve business processes is an evolutionary 
process that must be managed as other business processes (BPs) are managed in 
modern organizations. The proposed model – the learning process model 
(LPM) – suggests a closed-loop-model approach applied to a generic process 
model (GPM), which is a formal state-based and goal-based approach to 
process modeling. LPM strives to establish a learning process by (1) identifying 
goal and soft-goal states of the initial process model, (2) identifying exceptional 
states and incomplete state definitions at runtime, and (3) adapting 
automatically the process model according to the discovered states. 
Modifications provided by the learning process may be sufficient or may need 
to be complemented by non-automatic changes, when unacceptable business 
situations arise. The learning process also aims to adapt the current process 
model to possible technology, specific domain (e.g., clinical procedures at 
specific institutions), environmental requirements (e.g., regulations and 
policies), and process innovations. We demonstrate the application of LPM to a 
vaccination process.  
 
Keywords:  Learning, business process model, generic process model, clinical 
guidelines, exceptions, process flexibility, process adaptation, goals, soft-goals. 
1. Introduction 
In a dynamic business environment, business processes (BPs) need to be changed 
continuously [1-4] without affecting the production of the expected business values. 
The continuous business environment change, the shortening of required service time 
to market,  the increasing number of inter and intra-organization integrations and the 
early adoption of new business technologies makes it impossible to fully-represent 
business processes during their conception time. 
In this research, we postulate that it is possible to substitute the practice of fully 
representing business processes by a flexible adaptive form of designing, 
implementing, and managing business processes, through a business process learning 
approach. This approach would allow making a partial (minimal) definition of the 
business processes that would enable the organization to launch the required services 
with minimal time to market and seize business opportunities. Once the required 
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business initiative is launched and operating, data regarding the process execution and 
the extent to which goals and soft goals are attained are collected and analyzed, and 
deviations between the currently defined process model and the actual business 
process are detected. This forms the basis for learning and adapting the process based 
on the day by day process enactment experience. 
Such an approach is of particular importance in health-care processes, which may 
change on the fly in adaptation to specific patients, or change over time as a result of 
the availability of new knowledge. The clinical guidelines modeling research field 
provides several approaches for medical guidelines automation, discovery and even 
adaptation [5-8].  
This paper envisions learning in business processes, and constitutes a first step 
towards the design of automated processes that (1) define and track suitable 
parameters about the process execution and (2) learn how these processes should 
improve and update the process model accordingly. We base our approach on the 
Generic Process Model (GPM) [9, 10] which is a formal process specification, 
suitable for our purposes due to its explicit representation of goals. The paper 
illustrates a potential model for the business process learning through a medical 
immunization case study. 
2. Business Process learning model – a proposal 
We postulate that a process model needs to relate the process goals to the workflow 
required to accomplish them. Such a relation is necessary in order to evaluate whether 
the process execution is attaining its desired outcome (i.e., goals) and the performance 
of the process execution (i.e., soft-goals). In order for our model to be as formal as 
possible, we base it on the Generic process Model (GPM).  
2.1  Using a Formal BPM – the Generic process model (GPM) 
The focus of analysis in GPM is a domain, which is a part of the world. We describe 
the behavior of the domain using concepts from Bunge’s ontology [11, 12] and its 
adaptation to information systems [13, 14]. A domain is represented by a set of state 
variables, each depicting a relevant property of the domain and its value at a given 
time. We view a successful process as a sequence of unstable states of the domain, 
leading to a stable state, which belongs to a set of states that reflect the process goal. 
An unstable state is a state that must change due to actions within the domain (an 
internal event) while a stable state is a state that does not change unless forced to by 
action of the environment (an external event). Internal events are governed by 
transition laws that define the allowed (or necessary) state transitions (events).  
It is possible to define the projection of a process over a sub-domain, where the set 
of state variables addressed by the law is a subset of domain state-variables. Then, all 
transitions outside the sub-domain are considered external events, and the sub-domain 
may be in a stable state while the process is active in other parts of the domain. 
The process goal, as addressed by GPM, is the state achieved by the process. 
However, the goal concept is sometimes used also to describe business objectives. 
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GPM distinguishes process goals from soft-goals, which are defined as an order 
relation on goal states [10]. In other words, soft-goals relate to the desirability of 
possible states in the goal set (all meeting the condition that terminates the process) 
according to defined business objectives. These establish a ranking (order) among the 
goal states. For example, assume the goal of a process is a set of states where some 
medical treatment has been given to a patient, but a lower level of the patient’s blood 
pressure following this treatment is considered better than a higher one. 
Finally, GPM entails criteria for assessing the validity of a process, namely, its 
ability to achieve its goal [10]. It enables the analysis of a process to identify causes 
for invalidity and suggests appropriate redesign actions to eliminate these causes. 
2.2  Business process learning - definition 
While a process can reach its goal states through different paths, these paths may 
attain different soft-goal levels. In addition, while a particular path may improve a 
specific soft-goal it might simultaneously worsen another. Based upon the GPM 
process definition, the result of process instance executions may be categorized to two 
main categories: 
(1) Valid process instances which attain some process goal state. 
(2) Invalid process instances which do not reach any process goal state and terminate 
into exceptions (exceptions occur when a process attains an unlawful state during 
its execution and cannot reach its goal). 
The category of valid process instances may be further divided into an undefined 
number of sub-categories depending on attained levels of soft-goals. It is needless to 
say that a process path that leads to better soft-goal levels is preferred to others that 
lead to lower levels of soft-goals. Hence, it is clear that an organization must strive to 
improve continuously its capabilities to select better process paths in order to attain 
better soft-goal levels as well as fewer exception occurrences in runtime, namely, 
fewer instances where the process fails to achieve its goal. In parallel, the 
organization must strive to adapt (modify) its BP models because of new knowledge 
generated in the environment. Business process learning is the organization's 
capability to improve path selection through experience acquired from executing the 
business process, measuring the attained levels of soft goals and the exceptions rate. 
2.3  Business process learning- a process-based approach 
We postulate that a business process learning model can be established analogously to 
control systems theory, which bases the continuous improvement of the behavior of a 
controlled system through a closed-loop system-control model [15]. The closed-loop 
model is based upon a real-time feedback-loop that continuously modifies the system 
behavior in order to minimize the output error attained during system runtime. A 
thorough discussion of control systems can be found in [15].  
Adapting the model to BPM, at each process enactment, implies that: 
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(1) Soft-goals are measured and following their scores, the process model is 
evaluated to identify what specific segments of the state flow caused the 
improvement or worsening of each soft-goal. 
(2) Whenever exceptions occur they are analyzed and learned lessons are used to 
recommend process model changes  
(3) Once soft goal scores and exceptions are identified, the process law may be 
changed accordingly, so similar state flow will be repeated or avoided in future 
instances of the process. The updates may require changes in state definitions 
(i.e., modification of the set of relevant state variables, addition/modification of 
predicates defining sets of states, and/or transformation definitions). 
A closed-loop BP learning approach leads to the definition of the following 
learning process:  
(1) During process instance execution, a set of state variables that would enable the 
evaluation of the attained level of soft-goal and the occurrences of exceptions are 
collected. 
(2) Process instance soft-goal levels are evaluated. 
(3) Collected process datum of the specific process instance, together with soft-goal 
levels and exception occurrence indicators are stored. 
(4) The current process instance is compared to past experiences and assigned a 
relative score. 
(5) Future executions would use the collected information and score to select in 
runtime the best known path. 
2.4 Learning Process model (LPM) Assumptions 
For any formal conceptual model to be complete and valid, the ontological 
assumptions of the model need to be made explicit.  
The proposed LPM relies on the following assumptions: 
(1) The initial process model is valid, as far as we know (i.e., it was set in a way that 
is meant  to attain its goals considering an expected set of possible external 
events independently of the process learning capability).   
(2) Process mining capabilities do not affect process run time nor process 
performance.  
(3) Process soft goals are known a-priori and are measurable through the process 
mining capabilities. 
(4) Learning is based on the gaps between desired goals and actual execution of 
process instances. The process model is modified by: (a) comparing actual soft 
goals measurement to historical values of the process soft goals; (b) analyzing 
the current state flow as compared to past occurrences in order to explain the 
accomplished levels of soft-goals; (c) drawing required process model changes 
from exceptional process instances.  
2.5 LPM components 
We establish the following postulates: 
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Postulate 1: In order for the overall business process to be a learning process, it 
should include three main sub-processes: Acting (A) process, Documenting (D) 
process, and Learning (L) process, as described below.  
Postulate 2: These three processes are (in terms of the GPM) projections of the 
business process executed by the organization upon the respective sub-process 
domains (Acting, Documenting and Learning process domains).  
Postulate 3: The A, D, and L processes interact through a set of well-defined 
commitments, as explained below. In addition, the external environment can affect 
these processes.  
Postulate 4: The overall BP needs to adapt according to environment inputs. 
 
The respective five model components are hereby described: 
Component 1: An acting sub-process – the process that acts in order to accomplish 
the goals and soft goals of the process.  
Component 2: A documentation sub-process – the process that collects the 
necessary data from the acting process for three main purposes: (1) conditioning next 
actions in the current acting process instance depending on data collected in previous 
process instance steps and data collected from past process instances; data may also 
be collected from external business processes (the fifth component of the model- see 
below); (2) affecting actions in other process instances (current and future ones); (3) 
providing learning processes with data collected and processed during the process 
enactments (i.e., soft-goal measures and exception details). 
Component 3: A learning sub-process – the process in charge of adapting the 
business process model. It analyzes the collected data, produces required changes to 
support incurred exceptions, models needed changes, and introduces changes to the 
BPM. Note that each one of these sub-processes has its own goals and soft-goals. 
Component 4: Inter-process dependencies: The commitments between the internal 
business sub-processes (learning, acting, documenting) is the basis for defining a 
valid overall business process. The acting process commitments are: (1) to provide 
necessary data for documentation process; (2) to execute according to the business 
process model that may be changed by the Learning sub-process. 
The documenting process commitments are: (1) to collect necessary data for the 
acting process control/decision points; (2) to provide the acting process with data 
collected from previous process steps, past process instances, and data collected from 
external business processes; (3) to collect data for the learning sub-processes. 
The learning process commitments are: (1) to provide/execute necessary changes to 
the business process model. Note that changes (both to D and A processes) have two 
major sources: needed adaptations following soft-goal assessments and exceptions 
detected; (2) to provide visibility/traceability of changes, structured process history, 
reports needed for human intervention.  
Component 5: External (Human) processes & commitments: These are processes 
that affect the L, A, and D processes through inputs that are generated by the external 
environment. External processes are of two kinds: (1) modeling new cases, processes, 
and introducing innovation, when new medical knowledge is available (e.g., new 
drug, new available immunization); (2) manual management for handling exceptions. 
These are scenarios where the acting, learning, or documenting processes fail to 
continue their executing due to anomalies or unexpected situations. In such cases, 
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automatic learning is not always feasible, and an external entity (e.g., a human) may 
intervene to correct the situation. 
3. LPM Illustration through a case STUDY 
We use a clinical process based upon the guidelines for immunizations provided by 
the Institute for Clinical systems improvements (ICSI, [16]) as a case study. We start 
by presenting a hypothetical local version of the generic algorithm that addresses flu 
vaccination and is adapted to the workflow and regulation of a particular 
implementing healthcare institution. Next, we map the local process flow to our 
learning model and demonstrate how monitoring electronic medical record (EMR) 
data can be used to follow whether the executed process attains its goals or reaches 
undesired states, and how we can learn, that is, modify the process model in order to 
improve the extent to which it attains its goals or avoids undesired states. 
3.1 Defining a local version of the immunization process 
Fig. 1 shows a hypothetical local flu immunization process that follows the ICSI 
clinical algorithm [16]. When the patient is vaccinated for the first time in her life, the 
vaccine is provided in two portions, which are to be administered in two separate 
visits that are spaced one month apart. 
3.2 Identification of the Flu Vaccine Business Process  
We map the algorithm represented above into the components of the GPM process 
model – goals, soft-goals, states, intermediary states, and laws. 
Identification of process goals and sub-goals: 
Process goals:   (G1) "Identify an eligible child" 
(G2) "Provide vaccinations to an eligible child"   
Soft-goals:  (SG1) "Do our best to make the parent accept vaccinating his child. 
Parent Refusal to vaccinate is an undesirable outcome".  The score of this soft-goal is 
evaluated at the reached goal state; we consider it having a binary value: {desirable, 
undesirable}. 
Goals and soft-goals are represented by process states in GPM.  Although the process 
flow of  Fig. 1 does not have states, only activities, we use the convention that when a 
process has completed an activity it is in a state named by the activity, and this state 
remains until execution of a new activity begins. In this way, we associate goal and 
soft-goal states with outputs of different steps in the algorithm, as summarized in 
Table 1 and as marked in Fig. 1. Note that since goal states are stable states, the goal 
state corresponding to G1 is step 16 in the process model and not step 3. Note also 
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that the soft-goal in this case is of a discrete nature (i.e., goal state desirable or 
undesirable), whereas in other cases it may relate to continuous values. 
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Fig. 1. Local version of the flu vaccination algorithm (first time vaccination). Each step has 
been identified with the sub-processes: A-Acting, D-Documenting, L-Learning. We identified 
soft goals: Undesirable Goal states (steps 7, 15) and Desirable Goal states (steps 3, 16) 
Table 1. Goal mapping to Flu vaccination algorithm steps (algorithm represented in Fig. 1. 
Goal 
states 
Goal state definition Desirable/Undesirable (soft-goal 
accomplishment level) 
Step 
Outputs 
Desirable 16 G1 Identify an eligible child 
Desirable (or normally expected) 3 
Desirable 16 
Undesirable 7 
G2 "Provide flu vaccination 
to an eligible child". 
Undesirable 15 
 
Process states identification 
Mapping intermediary process states is done in the same way as process goal states. 
Each state is identified by a set of variables, as we demonstrate in Table 2 (we present 
here only state variables that are changed within each state, not the whole set of 
variables associated with all process states).  Note that the process has several states 
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that represent goal states (S2, S6, S11 and S14); process soft-goals are evaluated 
through the desirability of these goal states (see Table 1). 
Table 2. Business Process states mapping for the vaccination algorithm. State types may be S-
stable, U-Unstable or G-Goal. The state description indicates (in parentheses) the steps  whose 
outcome corresponds to these states. Note that the outcome of several steps correspond to the 
same state. In addition, not all steps necessarily cause a state transition. 
ID State name (corresponding 
step outcome) 
Type State variables update Next 
state 
S0 Initial state (1). S -- S1, S2 
S1 Checking Vaccine 
contraindications (2). 
U Eligible flu V. = Yes. S3 
S2 Contraindications present (3). G Eligible flu V. = No. -- 
S3 Patient  notified-overdue 
vaccine (4) 
S Flu V. Status= eligible; 
Notified=Yes. 
S3, S4 
S4 MD discusses Vaccine with 
Patient (5) 
U Flue V. MD Check=done. S5, S6 
S5 MD checks Patient (6,8,8b) U Flue V. MD checking = Yes. S7, 
S8,S13 
S6 Patient refuses vaccine (7). G Flu V. Status = Refused. -- 
S7 Parent asked to buy part 1 of 
Vaccine (11,12). 
S Flu V. Status= "waiting - part 1" S7, S9 
S8 Temporal contraindications 
present (9,9b,10,10b) 
U Flu V. Status= "rescheduled- 
contraindications". 
S7, S8, 
S14 
S9 First part vaccine administered 
(13) 
U Flu V. Status= "1st part 
administered". 
S10, S11 
S10 Patient Notified- part 2 within 1 
month (11b). 
S Flu V. Status= "waiting for part 
2". 
S10, S12 
S11 Adverse event present reported 
(14,14b,15) 
G Adverse event = Yes; Adverse 
event report=<…>.  
-- 
S12 Parent buys part 2 Vaccine 
(12b) 
U Flu V. Status= "Prepared for part 
2". 
S5 
S13 Part 2 vaccine administered  
(13b) 
U Flue V.Status= "Part 2- 
completed". 
S11, S14 
S14 Flue vaccination completed 
(16) 
G Flu V. Status= "completed". -- 
 
Our Learning approach is based on collecting data from process instances and 
evaluating the process execution based on them. In clinical applications, the electronic 
medical record (EMR) may be used for documenting patient-related process-flows 
within the clinical system, providing a full tracking of the process state. Obviously, 
the EMR should include all relevant state variable data of the current and past process 
states. This has two major outcomes: 
(1) The EMR becomes our major data base not only for patient data, but also for 
process flow information. 
(2) We establish important foundations for a formal definition of the data required 
for process state tracking.  
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Note that data to be included in the EMR need to reflect not only the current state of 
the process but also enable the user to have a clear view of the process history. This is 
a challenge that our approach is capable of solving through the described state 
mapping- the inherent state variable based state definition. The described example 
shows how we can assure process tracking by mining the specified state variable data. 
Process Law specification: 
The process law specifies the possible transitions within the process flow. We mapped 
the possible transitions for each state in Table 2-"Next state" column. Transitions may 
be triggered by internal events (i.e., part of the process model) or external events (i.e., 
events that are generated from outside the process domain). According to GPM, 
internal events are sufficient for triggering a state transition from an unstable state, 
whereas a transition from a stable state requires an external event. In Table 2, we 
establish the state type for each state ("Type" column). 
3.3 LPM in the Case Study 
We can now demonstrate how learning can be performed.  
Outcome data assessment: After the first year of executing the local process, the 
following conclusions were drawn at the implementing institution: 
(1) The number of parents that were willing to vaccinate their children is high 
(state S5 reached). 
(2) The number of patients that completed their vaccination was smaller than 
those who were willing to vaccinate. This was judged by an exception that 
occurred along different instances: the process did not reach a goal state, but 
remained stuck in step 12b (state S12). 
Identifying possible causes through execution and external data analysis: 
Further investigation showed that some of the parents who consented to vaccinate 
their children could not complete their vaccinations due to shortage of the vaccine in 
the market. This is due to the logistical process in pharmacies, where inventory 
dependencies were not established between first and second portions of the vaccines. 
The shortage of vaccines invalidated the whole vaccination process for these patients. 
That is, the actual process flow was different from the model of the local process 
flow: step 8b (in Fig. 1) was not always reached.   
GPM-based analysis: In GPM terms, state S5 was not reached for the second time, 
and the process was “stuck” in state S12. Surprisingly, S12 was identified as an 
unstable state. This implied that one of the following was occurring: 
Option (1): S12 is a stable state and an external event is not being delivered, or, 
Option (2): the model is missing a state between states S12 and S5 (steps 12b and 8b). 
Considering the vaccine purchase within the process domain, option (2) is the valid 
one for the current case. The vaccine shortage is a newly discovered stable state. Note 
that we could consider the market as being in the environment of the process domain. 
Then S12 would be a stable state, awaiting an external event (vaccine purchasing). 
Suggesting and evaluating possible modifications to the process model: First, the 
learning process can modify the modeled local system to reflect the actual flow, 
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turning step 12 and 12b into decision points and adding a new flow into a new step 17 
"market shortage" in addition to the normal flow into step 8b. In GPM terms, this 
results in a new undesired stable state. However, this modification by itself did not 
solve the problem, as parents did not wish to vaccinate their other children after their 
bad experiences. Nevertheless, the modification made the problem explicit and 
understood, so two manual solutions could be proposed:  
(1) Modifying the external environment processes in order to eliminate this exception. 
In our case, the inventory management processes of the clinic's pharmacy were not 
controlled by the clinical teams and therefore this solution was not feasible. External 
pharmacies were willing to adapt their processes only if the clinic could give them 
exclusivity agreements, which contradicted current legislations.  
(2) Modifying the internal process flow to eliminate the stable state. To do so, the 
clinic required parents to purchase both immunization portions before administering 
the first portion. The second portion would be stored at the clinic until its 
administration, ensuring that the immunization process will be completed and thus 
eliminating the undesirable situation of portion 2 shortage. The modified process, 
including the automatically learned state and manual modification, is presented in Fig. 
2. Note that shortage is still possible, but either a patient gets both portions, or none.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flu vaccine process modified following the learning and external changes. 
Note the automatic learning process has generated a new process step (step 17- 
market shortage) and detected a transition to it from step 12 (converted to a decision 
step). Note also the effect of non-automatic learning - elimination of step 12b (Parent 
buys part 2 vaccine) and the addition of steps 18 and 19. 
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4. Discussion 
We illustrated how BP learning can be established based upon evaluation of soft-
goals and exceptional states in process instances, and proposal of changes (manual, 
automatic, or semi-automatic) to the process model in order to minimize exceptions 
and to improve soft-goal accomplishment levels.  
Examining the literature, we found several process model adaptation approaches 
proposed in the general BPM field [2, 4, 17, 18] as well as in medical guidelines 
modeling [2, 6]. Different process mining methods have been already discussed and 
applied in the BPM field [1, 4, 17] and in the clinical guidelines research [5, 19]. 
Comparison of a defined process model to the actual one discovered has been 
proposed [7, 19], as well as a statistic-based approach to propose ad-hoc changes both 
at process instance level an at process model levels [2, 3]. However, as far as we 
know, the examined literature is focused on understanding the actual control flow, 
without relating it to the process outcomes. Furthermore, it does not provide any 
methodology for defining the data needed for extending process mining to address 
both the process and its outcomes. Examining the process states definition of Table 2, 
we can easily identify the minimum EMR data needed to identify the process current 
state and history at any moment. Moreover, as state transitions cause changes in a 
subset of the domain state variables, tracking these state variables is sufficient for 
tracking the process state. Hence, the LPM can provide the data model required for 
mining a more holistic view of the actual process through the identification of the 
required state variables and the according documenting process. This is independent 
of which process mining algorithm is used and whatever process runtime model is 
used. We consider this to be a considerable advantage of LPM.  
Learning is an evolutionary process, whose initial model is presented in this paper. 
As we execute the process we may face several situations which the learning process 
must address: 
(1) Incomplete process model specification, i.e., unidentified states, incomplete state 
definitions, missing external events, and potential exceptions that invalidate the 
process execution.  
(2) Causality relationships of selected process paths and achieved soft-goal values. 
(3) Progress of new knowledge in the field, novel technology, or process 
innovations, which require changing the process 
We must aim to provide the required changes at a process model proactively. To this 
end, LPM proposes a learning lifecycle-model based upon the process-goal approach. 
The contributions that we have made so far include: (a) A formal business process 
model-based approach that identifies the process execution state and how it attains its 
goals at any time. (b) A methodology for identifying what data sets need to be 
collected as part of process mining in order to enable process-learning. (c) A learning 
approach that introduces changes to the process model based upon identified 
exceptions, missing external events, and attainment of goals and soft-goals (the data 
sets described in (b)).  The learning demonstrated in this paper relates to exception 
occurrences, while learning in general should also relate to soft-goal attained as a 
result of path selection. This will require the application of learning algorithms, which 
we intend to develop as future research. Note that while some learning may be done 
automatically, the modification of the business process may require, in no-error 
5th International Conference on BPM 2007 Workshop: BPM in Healthcare
Page 75
        
tolerant applications (such as health care), some sort of expert confirmation before 
applying the modification. This does not contradict our approach.  
Further work must be done to analyze potential automatic updates to the business 
process model. Another issue yet to be investigated is how knowledge integration 
could be accomplished based upon LPM. 
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Abstract.  Organizational processes in general and patient-care processes in 
particular, change over time. This may be in response to situations unpredicted 
by a predefined business process model (or clinical guideline), or as a result of 
new knowledge which has not yet been incorporated into the model. Process 
mining techniques enable capturing process changes, evaluating the gaps 
between the predefined model and the practiced process, and modifying the 
model accordingly. This position paper motivates the extension of process 
mining in order to capture not only deviations from the process model, but also 
the outcomes associated with them (e.g., patient improving or deteriorating). 
These should be taken into account when modifications to the process are 
made. 
Keywords: Process mining, business process modeling, Clinical guidelines 
 
1. Introduction 
Organizations often try to improve the quality of services provided to their clients by 
specifying a business process model (BPM) that captures the desired workflow in the 
organization and how exceptional situations should be handled. The aim is that if 
these process models would be implemented, the quality of services would increase 
and costs would be saved. In the healthcare domain, special attention has been given 
to creating evidence-based clinical guidelines that recommend care processes for 
patients with defined clinical conditions. Research has been carried out in developing 
methodologies and tools for specifying guidelines as computer-interpretable 
algorithms [1], linking them to clinical databases, executing them, and evaluating the 
impact of these systems [2]. 
However, organizational processes in general, and patient-care processes in 
particular, change over time. In real life, we often encounter situations that we 
neglected to consider in our BPM (e.g., guideline model). These situations could 
require process paths that were not specified in the BPM. In addition, expanding 
medical (or in general, organizational) knowledge on new procedures, available 
treatment options, and evidence for their effectiveness, may push users and 
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organizations into changing their process implementations, often before updating the 
BPM. Thus, we may find that the actors participating in the business processes 
(patient-care processes) often do not follow the BPM exactly and may act differently 
than the model specifies, which may or may not be justified or helpful. 
Deviations of the actual performed process from its model have been studied both 
in the BPM community and in the Medical Informatics community. In the BPM 
community, process mining has been used to capture process changes, evaluate the 
gaps between the predefined BPM and the practiced process, and modifying the BPM 
accordingly [3, 4].  
In the Medical Informatics community, critiquing approaches [5-7] have been used 
to compare the actual processes executed to their specified model. Advani et al. [7] 
describe a model and algorithm for deriving structured quality indicators and auditing 
protocols from formalized specifications of guidelines used in decision support 
systems. This critiquing approach can be used to determine whether the deviations 
followed the intentions of the original model and thus were justified. Traum-AID [6] 
is a rule-based system combined with a planner. Its critiquing interface examines 
actions the physician intends to carry out, identifies errors and calculates their 
significance, and produces a critique in response to those intentions. In the 1980's, 
Miller [5]developed several critiquing systems in which the physician inputs medical 
information describing a patient, a current set of test results, and current actions (e.g., 
ventilator settings), and a proposed set of new actions. The system assesses 
appropriate treatment goals, and uses those goals for critiquing. 
Similar analysis can be used to offer decision-support to physicians only when 
they deviated from these intentions. Quaglini et al. [8] developed computerized 
guideline implementations that allow users not to follow al the actions specified in the 
model, justify the deviation, and select alternative activities out of a wide range of 
activities that were not planned by the guideline authors but that are related to the 
original alternative via hierarchies taken from standard clinical vocabularies. 
Similarly, many computerized guideline formalisms have tools that allow the user to 
deviate from the normal sequence of activities [9], as flexibility is often needed when 
the modeled guideline is to handle emergency situations in patients or when the model 
is out of date and  does not convey the latest medical knowledge. Peleg and Kantor 
[10] used process mining to automatically  analyze differences between two versions 
of process models that were created due to the expansion of medical knowledge, in 
order to find differences in particular medical knowledge concepts (e.g., new drug) or 
in concept relationships (e.g., pathogen is not longer believed to cause a disease). 
As we strive to improve our BPMs (patient-care models), we must not only track 
deviations from the process model, but also the outcomes associated with them (e.g., 
patient improving or deteriorating) so that these could be taken into account when 
modifications to the process are made. 
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2. Background 
In order to follow process outcomes and relate them to changes in the process, we 
need a formal process model that can represent goals and outcomes. We rely on the 
Generic Process Model (GPM) proposed by Soffer and Wand [11]. 
2.1 The Generic Process Model (GPM) 
GPM is a state-based view of a process including the concept of goals. Briefly, GPM 
offers a process model which is composed of a quadruple <S, L, I, G>, where S is a 
set of states representing the domain of the process. Each state in an enacted process 
holds the values of all the properties (or state variables) of the process domain at a 
moment in time. The law L specifies possible state transitions as mapping between 
subsets of states, defined by conditions over values of the domain state variables; I is 
a subset of unstable states, which are the initial states of the process after a triggering 
external event has occurred; G is a subset of stable states on which the process 
terminates, termed the goal of the process.  
The process goal as addressed by GPM is a state meeting the conditions that should 
be achieved by the process. GPM distinguishes process goals from soft-goals, which 
are defined as an order relation on goal states [12]. In other words, soft-goals relate to 
the desirability of possible states in the goal set (all meeting the condition that 
terminates the process) according to defined business objectives. For example, the 
goal of a process may be a state where some treatment has been given to a patient, but 
a state where the treatment does not incur side effects is considered as “better” than a 
state where side effects are observed. Finally, GPM entails criteria for assessing the 
validity of a process, namely, its ability to achieve its goal [11]. It enables the analysis 
of a process to identify causes for invalidity, and suggests appropriate redesign 
actions to eliminate these causes. 
For operational and representational purposes, GPM’s law can be mapped to Petri 
Nets [13]; states correspond to sets of places of the Petri Net and laws correspond to 
transitions (including transition guards). Complementing this representation, GPM’s 
clear distinction of goals and soft-goals can form a basis for improving a practiced 
process, where improvement can be related to attained soft-goal values and to fewer 
situations where the goals of the process are not met. 
3. Research Objectives 
Objective 1: Develop a method for establishing process data on which outcome and 
goal analysis will be based. This includes patient-specific data referred to by the 
process model (e.g., age), data about activities that were started and completed, and 
data regarding outcomes, judged by relevant soft-goal attainment. 
Objective 2: Develop methods and tools for analyzing process data to identify 
relationships between patient-specific data, execution paths, process goals, and 
outcomes. 
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4. Demonstration of Our Approach 
To demonstrate and motivate our approach, we use a process model based on a 
guideline for treatment of ear infections (acute otitis media, AOM) [14]. Figure 1 
shows a Petri Net of the process model adapted from that guideline. Such a Petri Net 
can be automatically converted from a GLIF algorithm [15]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Petri Net representation of an ear infection clinical algorithm. Places, 
corresponding to GPM states, are marked as Pi. Transitions, corresponding to GPM 
laws, are marked as Li. P14 is the desired goal state, P15 is the undesired goal state, 
and P1 is the initial state. 
 
In order to have a measure of process attainment of soft and hard goals, and also 
of exceptions, where goals are not met, we need to analyze and mine the execution 
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log of the actual process, or their reflection in electronic medical records (EMRs), to 
document for each work item (i.e., an activity performed by an actor on a given case). 
In addition to the existing process mining ability to identify that an activity has been 
performed by an actor at a certain time, we also need to mine changes to state 
variables (e.g., a patient's temperature or his adverse response to a drug) that were not 
predicted by the process model, and their timestamp. These data could help us in 
relating activities (both those that followed the process model and those that represent 
changes) to outcomes. Table 1 presents a potential EMR of a 2.4 year-old patient 
reflecting the ear-infection process instance as well as outcomes. As can be seen, the 
physician first followed the guideline, prescribing Amoxycillin for 5 days, as the 
patient was over 2 years old. But, when AOM was not resolved and the goal state was 
not reached, he decided to prescribe a 10-day Amoxycillin, which was not according 
to the guideline. This time, the goal state was reached. Analysis of EMR data of other 
patients showed that in many of the 2-3 year old patients, AOM was not resolved after 
5-day treatment. These relationships between goals and outcomes could suggest ways 
to improve the clinical process. For example, change the laws L3 and L5 such that 
patient under 3 (not under 2) would receive a 10-day treatment (Figure 1). 
Table 1. EMR reflecting an ear-infection treatment process and outcomes 
Time-Date State variable Value Petri Net place 
07-01-01:08:00 AOM mild P6 
07-01-01:08:10 Medication 5-day Amoxycillin P9 
07-01-21:08:00 AOM mild P6 
07-01-21:08:10 Medication 10-day Amoxycillin P4 
07-02-12:08:00 AOM false P14 
5. Future Work 
While the above ear infection scenario demonstrates the potential contribution of 
process execution and outcome analysis, a systematic method for such analysis is still 
under development. We are currently working on a hypothetical case study, taken 
from the clinical guideline domain of vaccinations, which examines actual execution 
or processes (as determined from synthetic EMR records). We will study how we can 
automatically deduce from the EMR records whether instances of the process have 
attained the process model's soft and hard goals, and when and how to characterize 
exceptional situations. We would like to use data about real process execution and 
outcomes (log files) along with the preconceived process models to test whether our 
approach could be used to automatically assess attainment of soft and hard goals as 
well as assess the occurrence of an exception (i.e., the invalidation of the process due 
to an unexpected event), resulting in processes that do not meet their goals and remain 
in intermediate states. We would then like to combine outcomes analysis with delta 
analysis for populations of patient with similar characteristics to suggest a linkage 
between process changes and process outcomes. 
The main challenge we are facing is how to establish a causal relationship between 
the execution data (or delta analysis) and the obtained outcomes. The outcomes of 
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clinical processes are determined not only by the actions taken, but also by pre-
existing patient properties, such as age in the ear infection example. The analysis 
should take these properties into account as affecting variables, and provide 
recommendations with respect to specific patient properties.  
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